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Abstract 
 
South African home users of the Internet use the Internet to perform various everyday 
functions. These functions include, but are not limited to, online shopping, online 
gaming, social networking and online banking. Home users of online banking face 
multiple threats, such as phishing and social engineering. These threats come from 
hackers attempting to obtain confidential information, such as online banking 
authentication credentials, from home users. It is, thus, essential that home users of 
online banking be made aware of these threats, how to identify them and what 
countermeasures to implement to protect themselves from hackers. In this respect, 
information security awareness (ISA) programmes are an effective way of making the 
home users of online banking aware of both the threats they face and the 
countermeasures available to protect themselves from these threats.  
 
There are certain legal requirements with which South African banks have to comply 
when implementing ISA initiatives. Non-compliance or failure to demonstrate due 
care and due diligence should a security incident occur will result in financial 
penalties for the bank as well as possible brand damage and loss of customers. Banks 
implement international best practice recommendations in an effort to comply with 
legislation. These include recommendations for information security awareness.  
 
This research investigated both information security best practice recommendations 
and information security legal requirements for information security awareness. A 
selected list of information security best practices was investigated for best practice 
recommendations while a selected list of information security legislation was 
investigated for legal requirements imposed on South African banks. A gap analysis 
was performed on both these recommendations and requirements to determine 
whether the implementation of best practice recommendations resulted in compliance 
with legal requirements. The gap analysis found that the implementation of best 
practice recommendations does not result in compliance with legal requirements. 
Accordingly, the outcome of this research highlighted the importance of 
understanding the legal requirements and ensuring that adequate controls are in place 
with which to achieve compliance. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
South Africans use the Internet for business purposes and at home.  Home users, who 
have access to the Internet, use the Internet to perform various functions on a daily 
basis. These functions include online shopping, online gaming, social networking and 
online banking. Online banking is a convenient way in which to carry out banking 
tasks, such as managing bank accounts, checking an account transaction history, 
transferring money and paying bills. Online banking eliminates the need to travel to a 
bank each time the customer has to complete a transaction. Online banking gives 
individuals the option to bank in the comfort of their own homes. While convenient, 
home users face multiple threats when online banking, such as phishing and social 
engineering. These threats emanate from hackers attempting to obtain confidential 
information from home users, for example, online banking authentication credentials. 
It is, thus, essential that the home users of online banking be made aware of these 
threats, how to identify them and the countermeasures available to protect themselves 
from the hackers’ attempts.  
 
By definition, online banking is a system which allows home users to conduct their 
banking over the Internet (Investorwords, 2011). Online banking may also be defined 
as a service which consumers use to conduct financial transactions in a secure 
manner via a website operated by their banks (Wikipedia, 2011
a
). Cell phone banking 
is also a convenient alternative form of banking. This form of banking makes use of a 
cell phone to enable users to perform several of the tasks they would normally 
perform in the course of online banking, for example, viewing account balances, 
transferring money and paying accounts (Birch, 1999). Both online and cell phone 
banking have already become the subject of numerous international studies (Al-
Somali, Gholami & Clegg, 2009; Lassar, Manolis & Lassar, 2005; Pikkarainen, 
Pikkarainen, Karjaluoto & Pahnila, 2004; Sathye, 1999; Sadique Sohail & 
Shanmugham, 2003). In addition, there have also been studies carried out on online 
and cell phone banking in the African context (Brown, Cajee, Davies & Stroebel, 
2003; Gikandi & Bloor, 2009; Porteous, 2006). This research focuses on online 
banking by home users in a South African context.  The research recognises the 
following needs: 
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 the need for South African banks to protect their home users from the threats 
they face as online bankers (Albrechtsen & Hovden 2009; Da Veiga & Eloff, 
2010; Siponen, 2001; Wiederkehr, 2003) 
 the need for South African banks to demonstrate both due care and due 
diligence when addressing the threats faced by their home user base by 
implementing best practice (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Siponen, 2001; 
Wiederkehr, 2003) 
 the need for South African banks to take cognisance of both the legal and 
regulatory requirements imposed on them and the importance of compliance 
with these requirements (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Hansche, 2001; Siponen, 
2001) 
 
These needs form the basis of this investigation. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
It is incumbent on banks to satisfy certain legal requirements. Banks are able to draw 
on information security best practices when implementing an information security 
awareness (ISA) programme. The problem statement is therefore as follows: 
 
South African home users of online banking need to be informed on how they 
can protect themselves from losing sensitive personal information to malicious 
hackers.  South African banks need to demonstrate due diligence and due care, 
not only to help these home users protect themselves from current threats, but 
to also comply with applicable laws and regulations.  Banks can implement 
best practice controls in an effort to achieve this.  This investigation sets out to 
determine whether implementing information security awareness best 
practices results in automatic compliance with information security awareness 
laws and regulations. 
 
The research question and sub-questions addressed by this investigation include the 
following: 
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 In an attempt to protect home users of online banking from current 
threats, would the implementation of information security awareness 
best practices by South African banks automatically result in due 
diligence and due care requirements imposed by information security 
awareness legislation? 
 
 What are the current threats faced by home users of online 
banking? 
 What are the information security best practice 
recommendations for information security awareness of home 
users of online banking? 
 What are the information security legal requirements imposed 
on South African banks in respect of information security 
awareness for their home users of online banking?   
 Is there a gap between information security best practice 
recommendations and existing information security legal 
requirements?  
 
These questions guided the research in determining whether the implementation of 
ISA best practice will result in compliance with ISA legal requirements. 
1.3 Objective of the Research 
 
The objective of this research is to investigate whether a gap exists between the legal 
requirements imposed on banks for ISA programmes aimed at the home users of 
online banking and recommendations offered by information security best practice for 
such programmes. Accordingly, this investigation will help determine whether 
implementing ISA best practice necessarily results in compliance with ISA laws and 
regulations.  
1.4 Approach 
 
This research sets out to compare ISA best practice recommendations and ISA legal 
requirements in order to determine whether a gap does, indeed, exist. Selected 
information security best practices are analysed for recommendations for 
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implementation of an ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. In 
addition, selected information security legislation pertinent to South African banks is 
analysed for requirements imposed on South African banks when implementing an 
ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. The ISA best practice 
recommendations identified are then compared with the ISA legal requirements 
identified and any possible gap between the two noted. For the remainder of this 
research, ISA best practice and ISA legislation will be referred to as best practice and 
legislation respectively. 
 
1.5 Delineation of Scope 
 
Documents were selected based on criteria described in the relevant chapters.  
Although other widely-accepted international standards exist, such as ITIL, these 
were excluded as they make reference to the need for security and security 
management within their broader scope, but do not offer detail on security controls.  
 
The best practices or international standards identified include the following: 
 
 COBIT (Version 4.1) 
 ISO/IEC 27001 
 Standard of Good Practice for Information Security (2007) 
 
The legislation identified for this study includes the following: 
 
 Basel II 
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 
 The Code of Banking Practice 
 Consumer Protection Act, 2008 
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
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 Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (King III), 25 February, 2009 
 Electronic Communications Act, 2005 
1.6 Deliverables 
 
This dissertation makes a contribution towards research within the information 
security area while focusing on legislation and best practice for information security 
awareness. The researcher carried out a gap analysis on the legal requirements and the 
best practice recommendations for information security awareness aimed at the home 
users of online banking. The findings of this gap analysis are presented. The gap 
identified between best practice recommendations and legal requirements may serve 
as a basis for future investigations into the reasons why this gap exists and proposals 
to close this gap.  
1.7 Definitions 
 
Term Definition 
Law Rule or system of rules imposed by a government to regulate 
society and normally carry consequences for noncompliance 
(Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 2011
a
; Oxford English 
Dictionaries, 2011
a
) 
Regulation Official rule imposed and maintained by a relevant authority 
(Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 2011
b
; Oxford English 
Dictionaries, 2011
c
) 
Statute A statute is a written law, such as an Act, which has been formally 
passed by a legislative body (Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 
2011
c
; Oxford English Dictionaries, 2011
d
). 
Contractual 
obligation 
Deeds a party is obliged to perform, as stated in a contract 
(Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 2011
d
) 
Best practice A best practice is a procedure or method which is known to achieve 
the best possible results (BusinessDictionary, 2011; Methods & 
Tools QA Resources, 2009; Wikipedia, 2011
b
) 
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1.8 Dissertation Structure 
 
Figure 1-1 depicts an overview of the dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Dissertation structure  
 
The dissertation comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 defines the problem statement 
and presents the research questions.  
 
Chapter 2 places the research in context by means of a literature study carried out on 
previous research into ISA programmes.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Information 
security awareness 
programmes in banks  
Chapter 4: Information 
security awareness best 
practice 
Chapter 5: Information 
security awareness 
legislation 
Chapter 6: The gap between best practice recommendations and legal 
requirements 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and recommendations 
Chapter 3: Current and 
prevalent threats to online 
bankers 
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Chapter 3 identifies the current and most prevalent information security threats facing 
the home users of online banking – the very reasons why it is essential that security 
initiatives be in place. Up-to-date electronic sources are investigated for the latest 
information security threats as well as tips on ways in which to counter these threats. 
Recent statistics on information security threats will be analysed to ascertain the most 
prevalent information security threats.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 identify ISA recommendations and requirements by analysing a list 
of both selected international best practices and selected laws and regulations 
pertinent to information security in South African banks. Chapter 6 compares these 
recommendations and requirements and succeeds in identifying a gap.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the research by revisiting both the problem statement 
and the research questions. Chapter 7 also offers recommendations for future 
research.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Information security awareness (ISA) comprises one component of an information 
security programme and it is associated with the education of the end users of an 
information technology system on relevant information security threats and 
countermeasures. This research addresses the responsibilities incumbent on South 
African banks for the information security awareness of South African home users of 
online banking. This chapter discusses the background to the research topic and 
places the focus of the research in context.  
 
The literature study in this research comprises two parts. The first part addresses 
current ISA programme development and assessment instruments.   Literature on ISA 
programme development and assessment instruments is identified in prominent 
electronic academic journals and databases.  The purpose of the first part of the 
literature study is to investigate what guidance can be drawn from available literature 
for ISA programme development.  The second part of the literature study reviews 
factors which affect the acceptance of online banking by users to ascertain what users 
perceive as obstacles to their acceptance of online banking. Literature on the 
acceptance of online banking is identified in prominent electronic academic journals 
and databases. International studies are also included in the survey. The purpose of 
the second part of the literature study is to identify factors affecting the acceptance of 
online banking in order to gain an insight into users’ perceptions of the online banking 
service. An understanding of factors which prevent the end user from accepting online 
banking may shape the content of an ISA programme to demonstrate to the end user 
how online banking may be a safe banking option.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to highlight any information identified which may 
shape the content of an ISA programme in the relevant literature studied. Despite the 
fact that the literature surveyed in this chapter is not exhaustive it is, however, 
sufficient to satisfy the purpose of the literature study. 
  
Information Security Awareness Programmes in Banks 
Chapter 2 12 
2.2 Context of the Research 
 
2.2.1 Information Security Awareness Programme 
 
An ISA programme comprises one component of an information security 
management system (British Standards Institution, 2005). An ISA programme may be 
used to educate the end users of an information technology system on relevant threats 
and countermeasure available for their protection. In NIST Special Publication 800-
50, Wilson & Nash (2003) define the important elements of an ISA programme and 
puts the area of focus of this research in context. According to Wilson & Nash, a 
security awareness and training programme is made up of four critical elements, one 
of which is the development of both awareness and training materials. The subject of 
this research study is the development of awareness materials – the content.  
Figure 2-1 depicts a diagrammatic representation of these four critical elements and 
also of the context of this research.  
 
Figure 2-1 Critical elements of a security awareness and training programme 
 
2.2.2 Home Users 
 
The term “home users” refers to those individuals who use information technology to 
complete non-work related tasks outside of the workplace (ENISA, 2006). Home 
users may use the Internet for personal tasks such as online gaming, online shopping 
Security Awareness and Training Programme 
Design and 
planning of the 
awareness and 
training 
programme 
Development of 
the awareness 
and training 
materials 
Implementation 
of the awareness 
and training 
programme 
Measuring the 
effectiveness of 
the programme 
and updating the 
programme 
Development of 
the awareness 
materials 
Development of 
the training 
materials 
Four critical elements 
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and social networking. The Internet also enables home users to use online banking 
services.   
2.2.3 Online Banking 
 
By definition, online banking is a system which allows home users to do their banking 
over the Internet (Investorwords, 2011). Online banking may also be defined as a 
service which consumers use to conduct financial transactions in a secure manner via 
a website operated by their bank (Wikipedia, 2011ª). Online banking is a convenient 
way in which to carry out banking tasks such as managing bank accounts, checking an 
account transaction history, transferring money and paying bills.  Online banking 
eliminates the need to travel to a bank each time the customer needs to complete a 
transaction, thus offering the online banking users the option to bank in the comfort of 
their own homes. Although online banking is convenient, home users face multiple 
information security threats, such as phishing and social engineering, when they 
conduct online banking. These threats emanate from hackers attempting to obtain 
confidential information from home users. It is, thus, essential that the home users of 
online banking be made aware of both the information security threats which they 
face as online bankers as well as the countermeasures available to them.  
2.2.4 Background to the Research  
 
South Africans make use of both cell phone and internet banking on a daily basis. 
This has become increasingly evident in the South African media as major banks 
launch advertising campaigns promoting the benefits of these services and 
encouraging home users to make use of this convenient form of banking.  The number 
of internet users in South Africa has increased from 2.4 million users in 2000 to  
5.3 million users in 2009 (South Africa Internet Usage and Marketing Report , 2009). 
It is obvious that a large number of South African home users are both becoming 
aware of and being able to use online banking. Accordingly, from a security 
perspective, it is essential that the human element of the security chain be addressed 
(Albrechtsen, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Siponen, 2001). As more functionality 
is added to the online banking service, so the potential for greater vulnerability 
increases. The public is made aware of information security incidents through media 
reports and notifications when logging onto the online banking service. A simple 
Information Security Awareness Programmes in Banks 
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internet search on “phishing case” will yield several results of reported phishing 
incidents. It is vital that these threats render banks, security professionals and home 
users curious about both the responsibilities of banks in this regard and also what 
banks are able to do to make home users aware of the information security threats 
they face as online bankers.  
 
A possible solution may be the implementation of an ISA programme (Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2010; Kruger & Kearney, 2008; Siponen, 2001). Such a programme would be 
aimed at the home users of online banking. There are best practice frameworks, such 
as COBIT and ISO27001, which offer ISA guidance through control objectives and 
controls. These frameworks are discussed further in chapter 4. Previous research 
(ENISA, 2006; Hansche, 2001) and publications (Desman, 2002; Wilson & Nash, 
2003) offer guidance on ISA programmes. These are discussed in detail in the 
remainder of this chapter. It is also incumbent on banks to comply with certain laws 
and regulations such as the Protection of Personal Information Bill and the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act, 2002. Selected laws and regulations, which 
pertain to information security, are addressed in chapter 5. 
 
An independent auditor performs an audit on an annual basis in order to verify a 
bank’s compliance with laws and regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley. There are other 
laws which recommend annual auditing although controls are investigated only 
should an information security incident occur, such as the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill. When a finding is raised, the bank is expected to remedy the finding, 
offer a satisfactory explanation for the finding or face legal consequences. Laws and 
regulations present a “do or else” scenario. In addition, banks are also service 
providers which rely on their customer base to remain in business.  They face 
competition and it is essential that they keep their customers satisfied so as to prevent 
them from taking their business to one of these competitors. While banks need to 
comply with laws and regulations so as to satisfy the regulators, there is also an 
incentive to prevent incidents from occurring in order to maintain the confidence of 
their customer base.  
 
There is a constant “cat and mouse game” between hackers and security professionals 
(Harris, 2008). As soon as the security professionals find a solution to counter an 
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attack, the hackers find new vulnerabilities to exploit and new methods for doing so. 
With online banking being an environment which is characterised by ever-changing 
information security threat vectors banks will find favour with their customers if they 
take a strong stance on securing the activities of home users. 
 
In a 2010 interview conducted by Tom Field
a
 with journalist and author, Joseph 
Menn, Menn commented on the way in which banks may gain a competitive 
advantage by marketing their commitment to security. In 2008, the most expensive 
security incidents involved financial fraud with an average loss of $500 000 per 
victim (Richardson, 2008). In 2009, the Anti-Phishing Working Group reported that 
financial services are second only to payment services (financial services were first in 
2008) as the most targeted industry for phishing attacks with over 300 brands being 
subjected to phishing attempts in 2009. Information security threats and the 
consequences of breaches of security are damaging to both bank and customer. It is, 
thus, vitally important that banks stay abreast of the latest and most prevalent threats 
facing the home users of online banking and address these threats in their ISA 
programmes.  
 
Chief information officers (CIOs) have considerable responsibility with regard to 
security incidents. If they manage to prevent an incident from being made public in 
the media, they normally lose the business of the customer(s) affected as well as 
running the risk that the customer(s) may influence the decisions of other customers 
on where to bank. However, if the incident does become public, the bank will suffer 
brand damage and loss of business. Such an incident may result from an inability on 
the part of the home user to identify a phishing scam and respond to it, thus resulting 
in identity theft. While legislation presents a “do or else” scenario, the effects of 
consumer ignorance present a “do or die” scenario. Without customers, a bank will 
not remain in business.  
  
Although loss of business is a compelling reason to implement an effective ISA 
programme, nevertheless, it is essential that such a programme also be implemented 
in order to demonstrate due care should an incident or annual audit trigger an 
investigation. Due care proves that an organisation has implemented controls to 
protect the organisation, its resources, its employees and, in the case of online 
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banking, its customers (Harris, 2008). In the past, when a customer had lost money 
from their account, the bank would usually remedy the situation and absorb the risk 
itself. However, the case of PlainsCapital vs Hillary Machinery in 2010 may imply 
that banks are endeavouring to gain greater control over such situations.  
 
PlainsCapital is a $4 billion bank in the United States of America and Hillary 
Machinery was their client. According to McGlasson (2010)
a
, Hillary Machinery had 
$800 000 wired out of their bank account over a series of transactions. PlainsCapital 
managed to recover $600 000. Nevertheless, Hillary Machinery filed a lawsuit against 
the bank for the remaining $200 000. PlainsCaptial then filed a counter lawsuit, 
claiming that the incident was a result of Hillary Machinery’s inadequate security 
measures. The case has since been settled, although details of the settlement have not 
been disclosed.  If banks are to respond successfully, they need to satisfy due care 
investigations. In addition, it is essential that banks ensure all their bases are covered 
− one such base is that of home users. Home users are often seen as soft targets by 
hackers and they are targeted particularly by hackers who work for a profit.  
Accordingly, effective ISA programmes aimed at home users are an important 
component in a security plan. 
 
The objectives of this research are to identify both the ISA requirements which 
legislation imposes on banks as well as the recommendations offered by information 
security best practices when creating an ISA programme. The researcher will perform 
a gap analysis to identify the differences between the legal requirements and the best 
practice recommendations.  
2.3 Current ISA Programme Development and Assessment 
Instruments 
 
Information security awareness is of utmost importance to the success of the security 
strategy of an organisation. According to von Solms & von Solms (2004), one of the 
“deadly sins” of information security is the failure to appreciate the importance of 
information security awareness amongst users. In this section, the available literature 
on ISA programme development and ISA assessment instruments is surveyed.  
Literature on user acceptance of online banking is included in section 2.4 to gain an 
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insight into users’ perceptions of the online banking service. The literature on ISA 
programme development and assessment instruments contained in prominent 
electronic academic journals and databases is identified in this section. The purpose of 
this first part of the literature study is to investigate the guidelines for the development 
of ISA programme content which may be drawn from available ISA literature.  
 
The second part of the literature study reviews factors which affect the acceptance of 
online banking with literature on the acceptance of online banking in prominent 
electronic academic journals and databases being highlighted. International studies are 
also included in the survey. The purpose of the second part of the literature study 
which identifies factors affecting the acceptance of online banking is to gain an 
insight into users’ perceptions of the online banking service.  An understanding of 
what prevents the end user from accepting online banking may shape the content of an 
ISA programme aimed at demonstrating to the end user how online banking may be a 
safe banking option. The researchers surveyed are in no particular order but are, 
instead, grouped where their work is of a similar nature.   The literature surveyed is 
not exhaustive, nevertheless, it is sufficient to satisfy the purpose of this literature 
study.  
2.3.1 Da Veiga & Eloff (2010) 
 
Da Veiga & Eloff (2010) constructed a framework to create a security aware culture 
within an organisation. They illustrate the way in which behaviour may culminate in 
the prevailing culture amongst employees. Behaviour may be manipulated by the 
information security components which have been put in place. One such component 
is user security management, which includes user awareness. This framework may be 
adapted for home users. However, the content of an ISA programme which is aimed 
at an organisation’s employees will not be the same as the content of an ISA 
programme which is aimed at online banking home users. For example, a home user’s 
credentials provide them with access to their accounts, while a bank employee’s 
credentials may provide them with access to the records of thousands of credit 
cardholders. Accordingly, the threats in these two instances are not entirely the same 
and, thus, the content that needs to be communicated to the two groups through an 
ISA programme will not be the same. 
Information Security Awareness Programmes in Banks 
Chapter 2 18 
Da Veiga & Eloff identify seven information security components, with the user 
security management component addressing topics pertinent to a home user of online 
banking. These topics include trust, education and training, user awareness, ethical 
conduct and privacy. Da Veiga & Eloff’s framework may be used to create a culture 
of security awareness amongst home users. For example, the bank may decide to add 
functionality to its online banking service. Accordingly, policies, procedures and 
standards – enhanced by best practices – will be either updated or compiled to address 
the new functionality. However, this new functionality will also create the potential 
for new threats. It is, thus, essential that home users be made aware of both the new 
functionality and how to use it in a secure manner. This involves the user security 
management component. Users will be encouraged to trust the application once they 
have been made aware of the efforts which have been made to secure it. This may 
include the threats they face while using the application as well as simple 
countermeasures which the user may implement. Requirements, as stipulated by 
privacy laws, must be taken into consideration and users made aware of any 
information as stipulated by these laws. 
 
Da Veiga & Eloff’s framework addresses threats, laws and regulations and best 
practice. However, the framework offers high-level, rather than case-specific, 
guidance as it is an all-encompassing framework, from the organisational tier to the 
individual tier and from board level to end user level.  
2.3.2 Kruger & Kearney (2006); Kelly (2006); Wiederkehr (2003); Hansche 
(2001); Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009) 
 
Kruger & Kearney (2006) developed a model for assessing the level of information 
security awareness in an organisation. They realised that ignorance constitutes one of 
the biggest threats to computer systems and that, if an ISA programme were to 
address this issue of ignorance effectively, it would be necessary both to measure the 
level of ignorance and reduce the level of it. This model by Kearney focuses on the 
employees of an organisation and measures three aspects: knowledge (what you 
know), attitude (what you think) and behaviour (what you do). These three aspects 
were further divided into the six focus areas which were identified in the case study 
which Kruger & Kearney conducted during the development of their ISA programme. 
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Their questionnaire aimed at testing the respondents’ knowledge, attitude and 
behaviour in respect of the six focus areas. 
 
Their assessment model offers a process designed to determine the content of an ISA 
programme. The identification of the main objectives which an ISA programme aims 
to realise gives the programme focus. Based both on the main objectives which have 
been identified and the desire to mould the knowledge, behaviour and attitude of the 
users so as to facilitate the realisation of these objectives it becomes possible to 
determine the content of the ISA programme. 
 
Kelly (2006) also constructed a questionnaire which was designed to assess the level 
of security awareness within an organisation. This questionnaire was based on the 
most important security policies of the organisation. The objective of the 
questionnaire was to ensure users were aware of the most salient points contained in 
the most important policies. This questionnaire, like the model of Kruger & Kearney, 
offers a process whereby the content of an ISA programme may be determined. Kelly 
adopts the approach that if the security awareness amongst home users were to be 
evaluated, what questions would be asked? This, together with the information 
contained in the most important policies, forms the content of the awareness 
programme. However, despite the fact that this approach offers an effective starting 
point it does not offer specific guidance on what a South African bank should include 
in the content of an ISA programme aimed at the home users of its online banking 
service.   
 
Like Kruger & Kearney (2006) and Hansche (2001), Wiederkehr (2003) focuses on 
the main objectives of the ISA programme which were defined through Wiederkehr’s  
case study. While making use of best practices and ensuring that the latest threats are 
addressed, the content of the awareness programme is also based upon these 
objectives. The ISA programme being developed in Wiederkehr’s case study is aimed 
at employees and, thus, makes no mention of the laws and regulations with which 
banks need to comply in respect of their online banking home users. However, in 
Hansche’s list of ISA programme objectives, Hansche addresses both threats and 
federal laws and regulations.  
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Albrechtsen & Hovden (2009) use threat scenarios to shape the objectives of their 
ISA programme. Knowing the threats facing the home users of online banking makes 
it possible to construct threat scenarios. An ability on the part of home users to 
identify the various threats and to act accordingly constitutes the objectives of the ISA 
programme and moulds the content of this programme. 
 
Based on both the literature on ISA programme objectives and an assessment of the 
need to secure the home users of online banking, it becomes possible to develop the 
content of an ISA programme. The information gleaned from the literature study does 
not, however, offer specific guidance in a South African context.    
2.3.3 Taylor & Shepherd (2007)   
 
Taylor & Shepherd (2007) offer guidance on awareness materials.  The most notable 
section of their chapter is a list of eleven recommendations to be included in the ISA 
programme. The majority of these recommendations address threats and suggest that 
users be made aware of the countermeasures available that they may implement. The 
recommendations also address phishing, social engineering, security patches and 
weak passwords. However, despite the fact that these issues are all of real concern, 
risks are constantly changing (Kruger & Kearney, 2006; von Solms & von Solms, 
2004) and it is essential that ISA programmes be kept up to date to ensure that users 
are aware of the latest and most prevalent threats.  
 
Although Taylor & Shepherd offer more specific guidance on threat types, they do not 
address laws and regulations, nor do they suggest consulting best practice frameworks 
and recommendations. 
2.3.4 May (2008); McKenna (2009); Siponen (2000) 
 
Both May (2008) and McKenna (2009) offer guidance on the way in which to 
construct and present the ISA material but offer little on what the actual content of the 
ISA programme should be. 
 
Siponen (2000) points at best practices and appropriate standards in the development 
of an ISA programme framework and its content. The main objective of Siponen’s 
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article is to assess those behavioural theories which may be used in the 
implementation of an ISA programme in order to return a high acceptance rate by the 
end users. Siponen’s research is useful for the implementation of an ISA programme 
as it attempts to present a method for persuading users to adopt the content of a 
security awareness programme and to alter their behaviour based on the contents of 
the security awareness programme. Siponen’s research would probably be of 
assistance to banks in the implementation of their ISA programmes once the content 
had been compiled.  
2.3.5 Desman (2002); ENISA (2006) 
 
Desman (2002) targets professionals wanting to implement an ISA programme in an 
organisation. Desman is focused on building the foundation for the successful 
implementation of an ISA programme. This includes gaining top management 
approval, gathering and assessing the documentation which is already available as 
well as devising ways in which to facilitate smooth implementation. Such guidance 
would work hand in hand with a framework which was aimed at developing the 
content of an ISA programme and, thus, ensure smooth implementation. 
 
The ENISA guide to raising information security awareness identifies home users as 
one of its target audiences. This guide offers a generic plan for creating, implementing 
and measuring an ISA programme. It adopts the approach of first defining the 
objectives of the ISA programme and then offers recommendations on how to ensure 
that the message reaches the correct audience. ENISA lists factors which are critical 
for programme success. In addition, it also stresses the importance of incorporating 
working lessons already learnt into the ISA programme to ensure continuous 
improvement. However, while comprehensive, this guide is not industry specific and 
it warns that a “one-size-fits-all” approach inevitably fails. Nevertheless, if this is 
borne in mind, the ENISA guide, like Desman (2002), would partner well with an 
industry specific guide on content development.   
2.3.6 Kruger & Kearney (2008) 
 
Kruger & Kearney (2008) present techniques designed to assist in deciding the most 
important topics to be included in an ISA programme. This is useful in preventing 
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information overload. Once the ISA team has compiled the potential content, these 
techniques could be applied to ascertain the focus areas to be addressed by the ISA 
programme. This offers an alternative method to identifying the objectives first and 
then developing the content based on these objectives. However, these techniques do 
not offer guidance to a South African bank in compiling the information which should 
be communicated to the home users of online banking.   
2.3.7 Valentine (2006) 
 
Valentine (2006) recognises the importance of industry-specific ISA programmes as 
opposed to a generic solution. Valentine outlines the following three phases, namely, 
assessment, identification and education. In the assessment phase the questions posed 
include: What are we protecting? What do we need to adhere to? How may we best 
achieve this? The identification phase asks questions such as: Who is the target 
audience and what threats do the members of the target audience face? What do they 
need to know? The education phase deals with training and is, thus, outside of the 
scope of this research.  Valentine’s article would be of assistance to the ISA team in 
kick-starting their thinking about the objectives of the ISA programme although it 
does not offer specific guidance for ensuring that all the relevant content is 
considered. 
2.3.8 Siponen (2001) 
 
The number of home users who are potential targets for hackers is increasing 
constantly. As a result, Siponen (2001) has identified the need to extend information 
security awareness beyond the borders of an organisation into the public domain. 
Siponen identifies five dimensions of information security awareness.  These five 
dimensions address the following: 
 
 insider threats in the organisational dimension 
 latest and most prevalent threats in the general public dimension 
 laws and regulations in the sociopolitical dimension 
 the connection between security and ethics in the computer ethical dimension 
 the need for education to alter the behaviour of users in an attempt to mitigate 
the risks facing them 
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These dimensions offer useful guidance on those issues that an ISA programme 
should address. However, there is still no industry-specific guidance available. 
2.3.9 Rotvold (2008) 
 
Rotvold (2008) focuses on ISA programmes which are aimed at the employees of an 
organisation. Rotvold encourages the ISA team to identify the major objectives of the 
ISA programme and to communicate these objectives to create a security culture. The 
paper offers a helpful list of topics for inclusion in an ISA programme – these topics 
include threats, countermeasures and compliance with laws and regulations. However, 
when using this document as a guideline it is essential that, the ISA team or security 
officer remain cognisant of the fact that these topics are not necessarily all relevant to 
the home users of online baking.  
2.3.10 Peltier (2005) 
 
According to Peltier (2005), an organisation may have the best security measures in 
place but, if the end users are not aware of the dangers they face, the security plan will 
not succeed. In common with the warnings of the ENISA guide, Peltier highlights the 
importance of making the content of an ISA programme relevant to the target 
audience. Peltier goes on to recommend that the ISA team conduct a risk assessment 
which should be supplemented by an analysis of the breaches reported in the media 
involving home users. A risk assessment is a good starting point in the compilation of 
an ISA programme. In addition, it is vital that the ISA team ensure that risks 
associated with non-compliance with laws and regulations are included in the risk 
assessment. Where relevant, best practices should also be taken into account when 
compiling the content for the ISA programme. 
 
2.3.11 Wiles, Claypoole, Henry, Drake & Lowther (2008) 
 
Wiles, Claypoole, Henry, Drake & Lowther (2008) include a chapter on developing 
an effective security awareness programme where customers are included in the target 
audience. However, despite the fact that Wiles et al also address the issues of privacy 
and compliance and stresses the importance of these issues, the guidance given by 
them is high-level and not specific to the case of South African home users of online 
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banking. Wiles et al also cover categories of awareness evaluation which may, in turn, 
be interpreted as the threats facing home users. Like Desman (2002) and Taylor & 
Shepherd (2007), the objective of the chapter by Wiles et al is to offer high-level, 
generic guidance for an ISA programme. 
2.4 Acceptance of Online Banking 
 
An identification of factors affecting the acceptance of online banking is helpful for 
gaining an insight into users’ perceptions of online banking services. In addition, an 
understanding of what prevents the end user from accepting online banking will 
enable the ISA team, through the ISA programme, to demonstrate to the end user how 
online banking is a safe banking option. 
 
In this section, a number of acceptance studies will be analysed to determine factors 
that prevent users from accepting online banking. It is hoped that this will point to the 
need for certain content to be included in an ISA programme.  
 
Al-Somali et al (2009) identified trust as a factor affecting the acceptance of online 
banking. Users place high importance on being able to trust their online transactions 
and are more willing to commit to using an online service if they feel they are able to 
trust the service. Al-Somali et al (2009) found that, if banks demonstrated the safety 
features of online banking, users would be encouraged to use the service. 
 
Sathye (1999) found that 77% of personal respondents who were aware of online 
banking and 95% of personal respondents who were not aware of online banking cited 
security concerns as a factor affecting their acceptance of online banking.  These 
percentages constitute a high percentage of potential business. An ISA programme 
could, thus, highlight the security measures taken by a bank in the case of online 
banking so that, as users become aware of the online banking service, they would also 
become aware that the service is safe to use. In addition, the ISA programme should 
also communicate the roles and responsibilities of the users in making online banking 
a safe service to use. 
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Kim, Tao, Shin and Kim (2010) recognise that, if users believe online banking is safe, 
they will trust the service and this will, in turn, lead to increased acceptance of the 
service. Kim et al focus on e-payment systems such as e-cash, and debit and credit 
cards. While this does not refer specifically to online banking, the concepts are similar 
with similar risks. The findings of this research emphasise the need for advertising the 
good security measures associated with the service to nurture trust.    
 
Sadique Sohail & Shanmugham (2003) identify trust and security concerns as two 
major factors affecting acceptance of online banking.  
 
It would appear there is sufficient support for banks to advertise their stance on 
security.  An appropriate vehicle for this would be their ISA programmes, in which 
the banks encourage users to make use of the online banking service. However, 
Pikkarainen et al (2004) also tested security and privacy as possible deterrents to the 
acceptance of online banking. They found that there is, in fact, a weak link between 
security and trust and the acceptance of online banking. However, despite this finding, 
these studies encourage ISA teams to promote the banks’ stand on security as well as 
the role of users in making online banking a safe service. In this way banks are also 
able to demonstrate to potential abusers that they are serious about security and will 
enforce consequences should a breach occur (Blumstein, 1978). 
2.5 Summary 
 
The literature surveyed addresses information security awareness within organisations 
as well as awareness initiatives aimed specifically at home users. A significant portion 
of the literature surveyed is of a generic nature, thus highlighting the need for more 
industry-specific, even case-specific, guidance. Although rarely found in the same 
research, results from this literature survey indicate that there are three major 
dimensions that should be taken into account when creating an ISA programme. 
These dimensions include, firstly, information security threats to online bankers; 
secondly, laws and regulations or the need for banks to comply with legislation; and, 
thirdly, the use of best practice. Information security threats create the need for 
legislation to regulate the banking industry as well as motivating the need for 
information security initiatives, such as ISA programmes, to be implemented. Based 
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on the results of the literature survey in this chapter, this research study aims to 
identify both the requirements imposed on banks by laws and regulations as well as 
the recommendations made by information security best practice when creating the 
content for an ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. These are 
compared to determine whether the implementation of best practice recommendations 
will result in compliance with the requirements as stipulated by the relevant laws and 
regulations. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Online banking offers home users with access to the Internet a convenient way to 
complete personal banking tasks such as checking account balances, transferring 
money and paying accounts. However, as the end users of the online banking service, 
home users also face multiple information security threats. These information security 
threats include social engineering, phishing and the installation of malware (Furnell, 
2008; Granova & Eloff, 2005). Recently, hackers have been using a blend of these 
threats when attacking their targets. For example, a phishing scam may tempt a user to 
click on a link which automatically downloads malware onto the home user’s personal 
computer. This malware may have the ability to monitor keystrokes and, thus, send 
information about the home user’s banking accounts to the hacker. It is, therefore, 
imperative that banks make their customers aware of both information security threats 
as well as simple countermeasures they may implement. Banks are able to achieve 
this through an Information Security Awareness (ISA) programme. Nevertheless, the 
methods used by hackers are constantly evolving, thus requiring that the information 
communicated to the home user be kept current.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the latest and most prevalent 
information security threats facing the home users of online banking. These threats 
have created the need for legislation aimed both at regulating information security in 
the banking industry and at motivating the need for the implementation of information 
security initiatives such as an ISA programme. Selected electronic sources will be 
analysed for information on information security threats. In addition, this chapter 
explains the way in which these documents were selected and how the documents 
were analysed. The culmination of this chapter is a top 10 list of the information 
security threats facing the home users of online banking. Throughout this chapter, 
information security threat terms are used. These terms are defined in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 Information security threat terminology 
Term Definition 
Phishing Phishing is an illegal attempt to obtain confidential and sensitive 
information either by email or by acting as a trusted party (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2011
b
; Wikipedia, 2011
c
) 
Social 
engineering 
Social engineering is the act of convincing a person to reveal 
confidential and sensitive information by acting as a party authorised 
to obtain that information (Harris, 2008; Wikipedia, 2011
d
)  
Malware Malware is an abbreviation for malicious software and refers to code 
written to access a system in an unauthorised manner. Examples 
include viruses, worms and trojans (Harris, 2008; Wikipedia, 2011
e
) 
Encryption In cryptography, encryption is the process of transforming 
information in its readable form to an unreadable, encrypted form 
(Harris, 2008; Wikipedia, 2011
f
) 
Authenticate Authentication is used to validate the identity and access rights of a 
subject when requesting access to an object, for example a home 
user’s attempt to access the online banking service (Harris, 2008) 
Firewall A firewall is a network component used to block and allow 
communication into and out of the network, based on configured rules 
(Wikipedia, 2011
g
) 
Spoofing Spoofing is used to describe a method of attack where the attacker 
acts as a trusted party, such as phishing, by hiding the origin of the 
message (Harris, 2008) 
Antivirus Antivirus software is used to prevent malware installation, detection 
of installed malware, and remove installed malware (Wikipedia, 
2011
h
) 
Identity theft Identity theft refers to fraud committed by a party acting as another 
party authorised to receive benefits, such as money (Wikipedia, 
2011
i
)  
 
3.2 Documents to be Analysed 
 
The objective of the analysis of selected documents is to create a “Top 10” list of the 
threats facing the home users of online banking. These threats are then matched with 
countermeasures that the home user may implement. For example, the user’s 
connection to the bank’s mainframe may use an SSL link although this does not 
protect the user’s computer. It is the responsibility of users to install personal firewalls 
and to ensure that the antivirus software on their computers is switched on and up to 
date. These threats facing the home users of online banking drive the need both for 
legislation aimed at regulating the banking industry and the implementation of ISA 
initiatives to educate home users on how to protect themselves. 
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ISA programmes should address those threats which are current and pertinent. 
Accordingly, the sources used to identify these threats should have the following 
attributes: 
 
 an information security focus 
 published content, written in the last two years, on current security topics 
 include, in their reporting, security threats which would target the home 
users of online banking 
 
The documents for analysis were taken from both electronic sources and electronic 
academic journals characterised by the above attributes. These documents were 
analysed for both information security threats facing online bankers as well as 
security countermeasures. The findings list the threats facing the home users of online 
banking as identified in the selected documentation. However, it would not be 
possible to include each attack type in an ISA programme as this may lead to an 
information overload. Accordingly, this chapter ultimately proposes a top 10 list of 
the information security threats facing home users of online banking which should be 
addressed by an ISA programme.  
 
The following electronic sources were identified: 
 
 SANS (www.sans.org) 
 National Cyber Security Alliance (www.staysafeonline.org) 
 CSOOnline (www.csoonline.com) 
 CIO (www.cio.com) 
 Bankinfosecurity (www.bankinfosecurity.com) 
 Elsevier academic papers (accessed online via UNISA Library) 
 
Although this is not an exhaustive list, for the scope of this research these sources 
may be considered sufficient. 
 
The electronic sources are analysed as follows: 
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 SANS.org was surveyed for the SANS Security Tip of the Day. These tips 
were categorised into the types of attacks which they address and the relevant 
attacks were added to the SANS list. 
 The National Cyber Security Alliance’s (NCSA) 2010 National Cybersecurity 
Awareness Month’s document, entitled What Home Users Can Do, was 
analysed for the information security threats facing home users. The NCSA 
website (www.staysafeonline.org) was also consulted for countermeasures 
which are available for home users to implement. 
 CSOonline.com and CIO.com were analysed for recent security articles 
addressing the information security threats facing the home users of online 
banking. 
 Bankinfosecurity.com was surveyed for the latest information security breach 
reports involving financial institutions and for articles addressing the 
information security threats facing home users. Cybercrimes targeting the 
home users of online banking were also pinpointed. 
 Elsevier academic papers were searched for articles published in the last two 
years on threats facing online bankers. 
 
In addition, it is suggested that banks should also research their own records to extract 
recent incidents involving their home users of online banking.  This would give them 
some insight into what their customers need to be protected from.  
3.3 Narrowing the list to a “Top 10” 
 
It is, however, not possible to include each information security threat in the ISA 
programme as this may lead to an information overload when communicating threats 
and countermeasures to the home user. Accordingly, the results of the document 
analysis were scaled down to represent a final top ten.  
 
Within an organisation it is recommended that a risk assessment type approach be 
adopted to narrow down the list of threats. A risk may be defined as the probability 
that a threat exploits a vulnerability, resulting in damage to the business (Harris, 
2008). Each threat would need to be rated on the probability of it occurring and the 
potential damage, should it occur. This would need to be deliberated by a specially 
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selected group representing top management, middle management as well as technical 
staff. The group should also include representatives from outside of IT from, for 
example, finance, marketing and human resources. A limitation to this research is that 
the research will not demonstrate this process. 
3.4 Building the Threat List 
 
In this section, each website and magazine is briefly described and the method used to 
survey the source explained. Thereafter, a table is presented displaying the threats 
facing the home users of online banking, any countermeasures specified by the source 
and the source’s reference. In conclusion, a summary of the threats is displayed in a 
further table. 
3.4.1 SANS 
 
The SANS (System Administration, Audit, Network, Security) Institute was 
established in 1989 and is active in both research and educational activities. Currently, 
SANS is a leading global provider of information security training and security 
certification. SANS reaches over 165 000 security professionals who contribute to the 
information security repository. SANS also makes freely available the largest 
collection of information security research documents in the world. SANS has been 
cited by numerous articles, mostly for its certifications and standards. These articles 
include:  
 
 “Information Security Policy – what do information security standards say?”, 
(Höne & Eloff, 2002) 
 “Why we need a new definition of Information Security” (Anderson, 2003) 
 “Wired versus Wireless Security: the Internet, WAP and iMode for E-
Commerce” (Ashley, Hinton, Vandenwauver & IBM Software Group, 2001) 
 
Resources available on SANS.org include: 
 
 security tip of the day 
 a weekly news digest 
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 a weekly vulnerability digest 
 over 1 200 award-winning information security research papers 
 
For this research study, the SANS Tip of the Day content was analysed for the threats 
which each tip addresses. The SANS Tip of the Day content is focused on security 
and addresses current threats. It also includes those threats affecting the home users of 
online banking.  
 
The SANS Tip of the Day was collected for the preceding four months − May 2010 to 
August 2010. Attacks relevant to home users of online banking are presented in Table 
3-2. 
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Table 3-2 SANS Threats 
Tip Threat(s) Identified Countermeasure (if specified) 
Check for encryption or secure 
sites when providing 
confidential information 
Minimal protection for confidential data  
Use Google’s cached mode to 
avoid spyware 
Keystroke logging to capture online banking 
authentication credentials 
 
Be sceptical when you read 
your email 
Phishing, social engineering  
Wireless hotspots. Limit 
activity to web surfing only 
Minimal protection for confidential data 
Use a good personal firewall and ensure software patches are up to 
date. Never do online banking at public hot spots. 
Watch out for shoulder surfers 
Shoulder surfing to gain online banking 
authentication credentials 
Ensure no-one is watching over your shoulder when you input your 
online banking credentials. 
Keep your password secret 
Unauthorised access to your online banking 
account 
Keep your password a secret to prevent others from abusing your 
account. If you share your password, your bank may not refund you 
stolen funds. 
Email is not the only online 
communication that has 
security risks 
Installation of malware to capture online 
banking authentication credentials 
Understand the security risks associated with online communication 
such as Instant Messaging. Hackers are able to transfer malware 
which may log your keystrokes when you are logging into your 
online banking account. 
Do not install Microsoft 
updates and patches sent by 
email (They are fake) 
Installation of malware to capture online 
banking authentication credentials 
Hackers are able to transfer malware which is able to log your 
keystrokes when you are logging into your online banking account. 
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Tip Threat(s) Identified Countermeasure (if specified) 
Do not fall for phishing 
schemes 
Phishing 
Avoid emails from “your bank” containing the following phrases: 
 We need to verify your account information 
 If you do not respond immediately, your account will be 
cancelled 
 Click the link below to update your information 
Change your password on a 
schedule 
Password guessing 
Keep passwords complex and change them periodically to better 
protect your online banking account. 
When you logout, logout 
completely 
Misuse of your online account by another 
person 
Logout completely when you have finished your online banking and 
do not set your browser to remember your password. 
Ten scams to screen from your 
email 
Phishing, spoofed websites 
 The “Nigerian” Email Scam 
 Phishing 
 Work-at-Home Scams 
 Fake software updates 
 Foreign lotteries 
 Sexual enhancement products 
 Check overpayment scams 
 Pay-in-Advance credit offers 
 Debt relief 
 SARS funds 
Do not click on links in pop-
ups or banner advertisements 
Phishing, keystroke logging 
Right click on the banner or pop-ups window on the task bar and 
click on Close.  
Beware of a USB flash drive’s 
autoplay feature 
Installation of malware from an unknown USB Disable the autoplay feature in the drive’s properties. 
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Tip Threat(s) Identified Countermeasure (if specified) 
If your browser questions a 
websites security, stop, think 
and verify 
Spoofed or compromised website 
Do not ignore warnings such as "There is a problem with the 
website's security certificate" or "Secure Connection Failed”. 
Contact your bank by telephone and query the warning before 
proceeding. 
Use a password in one place 
only 
Password capture or guessing 
Do not use your online banking password for other accounts. The 
databases at other companies may not be as well protected, thus 
enabling hackers to obtain your online banking password. 
Stop! Nobody sends email to 
dead people! 
Phishing 
Do not respond to phishing emails asking you to verify that you are 
alive by sending personal and financial information. 
It takes two to tango and two 
firewalls to secure your system 
Hacking and installation of malware 
If you have a home network, install both a hardware firewall and a 
software firewall on each connected computer. 
Do not trust links sent in email 
messages 
Phishing 
Ignore these emails as banks do not send emails requesting personal 
or financial information. 
Do not download files from 
unknown sources 
Downloading of malware If you are uncertain, do not download files from unknown sources. 
Do not plug in USB drives that 
you find lying around. 
Criminals may use them to 
steal your data. 
Loading of malware 
Malware may be loaded, enabling hackers to steal your information 
or take control of your computer 
Delete files effectively Capture of personal and financial information 
Do not leave documents containing sensitive information in your 
Recycle Bin. Empty the trash.  
If you access the Internet from 
a shared computer, make sure 
you do not leave anything 
behind 
Unauthorised access to your online banking 
account 
 Do not check the "Remember my password" box 
 Log off completely 
 If possible, clear both the browser cache and history 
 Never leave the computer unattended while you are logged in 
 Delete all documents you have used and empty the recycle bin 
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Tip Threat(s) Identified Countermeasure (if specified) 
Look before you click 
Phishing, spoofed websites, download of 
malware 
Do not open emails if you are unable to ascertain who the sender is. 
Do not allow Internet Explorer 
to store passwords for you 
Unauthorised access to your online banking 
account 
Ensure that the box for Internet Explorer to remember your 
password is unchecked, particularly on shared computers. 
Four tips to keep your 
computer secure 
Download of malware 
Install the following: 
 
 Antivirus 
 Anti-spyware 
 Two way personal firewall 
 Anti-keylogger 
Do not use information related 
to yourself as a password 
Password guessing  
Patch and update on a regular 
basis 
Hacker exploitation of vulnerabilities to gather 
information off your computer or to take 
control of your computer 
 
Make your password long Password guessing 
Try entering a passphrase. If it is not allowed, choose a password 
longer than 8 alphanumeric (letters and numbers) characters. 
Do not use unauthorised 
software 
Downloading of malware, such as spyware, to 
obtain your confidential information 
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3.4.2 National Cyber Security Alliance 
 
The National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA) forms strategic public and private 
partnerships with the intention of building and implementing education and awareness 
efforts aimed at home users, employees and students. The information disseminated 
through these efforts equips users with the knowledge and tools they need to keep 
themselves, their organisations, their systems, and their sensitive information safe and 
secure online, thus encouraging a security aware culture. The NCSA’s efforts in 2009 
reached over 40 000 000 people worldwide. 
 
The NCSA released a document for their National Cybersecurity Awareness Month 
entitled What Home Users Can Do.  The awareness month was October 2010. This 
document is current and addresses current threats. It also includes threats to the home 
users of online banking. The NCSA has been cited by numerous articles, most of 
which focus on home user security and security awareness. The articles include:  
 
 “Why users cannot use security” (Furnell, 2005) 
 “The psychology of security” (West, 2008) 
 “Unrealistic optimism in Internet events” (Campbell, Greenauer, Macaluso & 
End, 2007) 
 
This document was reviewed for the threats as addressed by their tips for home user 
online safety. Table 3-3 presents the threats related to the home users of online 
banking.   
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Table 3-3 NCSA Threats 
Threat Identified Countermeasure (if specified) 
Installation and downloading of malware which may allow hackers to 
monitor keystrokes, obtain confidential information from your computer or 
take control of your computer 
Use a set of security tools including anti-spyware, antivirus and 
personal firewalls. 
Vulnerabilities in software which hackers may exploit Make sure your operating system, web browser and other software is 
updated. 
Password guessing, resulting in unauthorised access to your online banking 
account 
Use long, complicated passwords or passphrases made up of 
alphanumeric characters. Change passwords periodically. 
Falling victim to phishing scams or spoofed sites and giving away 
confidential personal and financial information 
Stay alert and be careful not to give out confidential personal and 
financial information. 
Working on an infected computer Be aware of slower processing times, pop-ups and other unusual 
activities on your computer.  
If your home computer is shared, the other users may be unaware of security 
risks and perform activities which put both your computer and your 
information at risk. For example, checking the “Remember Password” box on 
Internet Explorer 
Educate family members and other users of your home computer on 
security risks and countermeasures.  
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3.4.3 CSOOnline 
 
CSO provides news, analysis and research and focuses on information security, 
physical security, business continuity, identity and access management and loss 
prevention. CSO is produced by CXO Media which is an award-winning member of 
the International Data Group. CXO Media also produces CIO.com. The CSO content 
is current and includes, in its reporting, threats facing the home users of online 
banking. CSOOnline articles have been cited during presentations at information 
security conferences. These articles include: 
 “High time for trusted computing” (Potter, 2009) 
 “A framework for reasoning about the human in the loop” (Cranor, 2008) 
  “Information security: an organisational change perspective” (Cline & Jensen, 
2004) 
 
The CSO website was searched using the following search terms: 
 
 top threats online bank 
 online bank threats home user 
 security awareness home user 
 
The searches yielded several relevant articles. These articles were then analysed for 
threats facing the home users of online banking. Table 3-4 presents the threats related 
to the home users of online banking. 
 
 
Table 3-4 CSOOnline threats 
 
 
Threat 
Identified 
Countermeasure Reference 
Social 
engineering 
Identify the attack, end communication and 
report the incident. 
Goodchild, 2010
a
 
Phishing Identify the attack, do not respond or click on 
any links, and report the incident. 
Goodchild, 2010
b
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3.4.4  CIO 
 
CIO.com’s target audience includes chief information officers and other IT leaders.  
CIO was established in 1987 and kicked off with CIO magazine. CIO provides 
technology and business leaders valuable analyses of both IT trends and the role of IT 
in realising business goals. Both the magazine and the website have received more 
than 160 awards. CIO content includes security topics and reports on threats facing 
the home users of online banking. CIO.com articles have been cited by other articles 
focusing mainly on IT as a business enabler. These articles include:  
 
 “The evolution of the KM function” (Smith & McKeen, 2003) 
 “Synergizing the learning organisation and knowledge management” 
(Loermans, 2002) 
 “An overview of IT service management” (Galup, Dattero, Quan & Conger, 
2009) 
 
The CIO website was searched using the following search terms: 
 
 Online banking threats home users 
 Top threats 
 Phishing 
 
The searches yielded several relevant articles published in the last two years.  These 
articles were analysed for threats facing the home users of online banking. Table 3-5 
presents the threats related to the home users of online banking.    
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Table 3-5 CIO Threats 
Threat Identified Countermeasure (if specified) Reference 
Phishing Identify the attack and do not respond. McMillan, 2009 
Phishing Use anti-spyware software and do not post personal information on social 
networking sites. 
Dahdah, 2008 
Cross-site scripting (XSS) Install trusted software designed to alert you when you are redirected from 
a legitimate site to a spoofed site. 
Spring, 2007 
Malware – emails containing malware that 
collects confidential personal and financial 
information 
Install antivirus software and keep it up to date. Hwang, 2008 
Phishing Be suspicious of emails and websites requesting or requiring confidential 
personal and financial information.  
Hwang, 2008 
Malware – installing software or services from 
an distrusted company 
Use only products from trusted companies and obtained via legitimate 
channels. 
Hwang, 2008 
Links in greeting emails – these may install 
malware 
Do not click on these links. Hwang, 2008 
Trojan intercepts online banking transactions 
and changes the destination account’s details 
to a hacker’s account details 
 Weil, 2008 
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3.4.5 Bankinfosecurity 
 
BankInfoSecurity is published by the Information Security Media Group, Corp. 
(ISMG) and specialises in information security, risk management and fraud. 
BankInfoSecurity.com provides reliable and current information on information 
security in financial institutions. The website addresses both dynamic compliance 
mandates and information security incidents such as breaches and other fraudulent 
activities.  
The articles are contributed and reviewed by a number of accomplished individuals, 
including risk management practitioners, industry experts and technology providers.  
These articles include reports on threats facing the home users of online banking. 
BankInfoSecurity.com articles have often been cited, mostly in articles dealing with 
data security in financial institutions. These articles include: 
 
 “Warranting data security” (Moringiello, 2010) 
 “Security issues in banking systems” (Ahmad, Rosalim, Yu Beng & Soo Fun, 
2010) 
 “ATM risk management and controls” (Rasiah, 2010) 
 
The Bankinfosecurity website was searched using the following search terms: 
 
 security breaches 
 home users 
 online threats 
 
The searches yielded several relevant articles. These articles were analysed for threats 
facing the home users of online banking. Table 3-6 presents the threats related to the 
home users of online banking.    
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Table 3-6 BankInfoSecurity Threats 
Threat Identified Countermeasure (if specified) Reference 
Exposure of data on the Internet Google your name, address and identity number periodically and report 
the incident if found 
McGlasson, 2010b 
Phishing, spoofed websites Learn to identify a potential phishing email or website, for example, check 
spelling and grammar. Be sceptical about emails and websites asking for 
confidential personal and financial information. Contact your bank 
telephonically to verify the validity of the request.    
Dhamija, Tygar & Hearst, 
2006 
Password guessing Strong password characters. RSA, 2007 
Phishing Educate consumers and encourage them to educate themselves on 
identifying a phishing email or website. 
RSA, 2007 
Phishing, identity theft Implementation and enforcement of strong authentication methods by the 
bank 
VeriSign, 2008 
SARS phishing email Identify the attack, do not respond and report it VeriSign, 2007 
Malware  VeriSign, 2007 
Malware Make use of antivirus software and personal firewalls. Ensure these are 
kept up to date. Be sceptical of links and attachments in emails. 
Field, 2010b 
Phishing, identity theft Implementation and enforcement of strong authentication methods by the 
bank. 
SafeNet, 2009 
Phishing  Symantec, 2007 
Malware  Symantec, 2007 
Malware Use antivirus software. Make sure all patches and software are up to date. 
Be wary of email attachments and links. 
Donchez, 2008 
Phishing Beware of emails from banks, eBay, SARS or other sites prompting you 
to upgrade your information. Do not click on links in the email to the 
relevant institution’s site. 
Donchez, 2008 
Password guessing Use a long, alphanumeric password. Really secure passwords are over 15 
characters long. 
Donchez, 2008 
Phishing  Swart, 2007 
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Threat Identified Countermeasure (if specified) Reference 
Malware that captures keystrokes and 
credentials 
 Swart, 2007 
Malware  Field, 2009 
Phishing, social engineering and identity theft  SafeNet, 2010 
Credential gathering malware  SafeNet, 2010 
Man-in-the-Browser (MITB) Attack  Use antivirus software and keep this software updated. Take precautions 
not to download or accidentally install malware. 
SafeNet, 2010 
Identity theft Implementation and enforcement of strong authentication methods by the 
bank. 
SafeNet, 2010 
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3.4.6 Elsevier Academic Papers 
 
Elsevier is the world's largest scientific, technical and medical information provider  
and forms part of the Reed Elsevier plc group, a world-leading publisher and 
information provider. Elsevier publishes academic papers which address information 
security topics, such as threats facing the home users of online banking.  
 
Elsevier articles were searched using the following search terms: 
 
 threats home users 
 threats online banking 
 home user security 
 
For the purposes of this research, articles published during the last two years and 
which addressed threats facing the home users of online banking were analysed.  
Table 3-7 presents the threats related to the home users of online banking as extracted 
from these articles. 
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Table 3-7 Elsevier threats 
Threat Identified Countermeasure (if specified) Reference 
Phishing Alias email address, digitally signed emails Bose & Leung, 2008 
Malware Make use of and keep updated antivirus, anti-keylogging and anti-trojan 
software as well as a personal firewall. 
Bose & Leung, 2008 
Spoofed sites Digital server certificate, trusted path ensured browser Bose & Leung, 2008 
Identity theft Two-factor authentication, zero knowledge proof Bose & Leung, 2008 
Malware  Brenner, 2007 
Fraud (phishing)  Brenner, 2007 
Phishing  Dodge, Carver & 
Ferguson, 2007 
Social engineering  Dodge et al, 2007 
Malware  Dodge et al, 2007 
Phishing  Furnell, Tsaganidi & 
Phippen, 2008 
Malware  Furnell et al, 2008 
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3.5 The Top 10 List 
 
The major threats facing home users which were identified were those threats which 
aided identity theft. The threats most frequently identified included phishing, spoofed 
or compromised websites and malware. Identity theft occurs once the perpetrator has 
obtained confidential information, such as online banking authentication credentials, 
through attack methods, such as phishing and social engineering, and then proceeds to 
impersonate the victim at a particular organisation’s website, such as a banking 
website. Table 3-8 presents a summary of the threats that were identified as well as 
those sources which identified the threat. Despite the fact that identity theft is 
mentioned infrequently, it may be assumed that identity theft is, indeed, the intention 
of the perpetrator who is endeavouring to acquire the confidential information.  
 
To avoid information overload, the number of threats addressed by an ISA 
programme should be limited to a top 10. For the purpose of this research, the threat 
list was narrowed down to include those threats which were mentioned by the greatest 
number of sources. Of the 15 threats identified, seven were cited by one source only. 
Of these seven threats, the two threats most often identified by the source included the 
existence of sensitive files in the user’s recycle bin and minimal protection afforded to 
confidential data during online transactions. These threats were mentioned twice each 
by SANS.org. The remaining five threats were all mentioned by their sources only 
once. The top 10 threats are 
 
 phishing 
 spoofed websites 
 keystroke logging 
 malware 
 social engineering 
 minimal protection afforded to data 
 password guessing or password theft 
 sensitive information in the user’s recycle bin 
 shared computer threats 
 out of date patches and software 
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Table 3-8 Threat summary 
 SOURCE 
THREAT SANS NCSA CSOOnline CIO BankInfoSecurity Elsevier 
Phishing, spoofed sites      
Keystroke logging      
Malware      
Social engineering      
Minimal protection afforded 
to confidential data 
     
Shoulder surfing      
Password guessing or theft      
Misuse of your online 
account by another person 
     
Sensitive info in recycle bin      
Shared computer threats      
Out of date patches and 
software 
     
Cross-site scripting      
Exposure of personal data 
on the Internet 
     
Man-in-the-Browser attack      
Identity theft      
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3.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the most prevalent threats to online bankers were identified.  These 
threats drive both the need for legislation aimed at regulating the banking industry and 
the need to implement an ISA programme designed to educate home users on how to 
protect themselves when banking online. It was found that aided identity theft was the 
most common threat. Despite the fact that other threats exist which may have a 
bearing on the content of an ISA programme, these threats were identified by the 
sources selected for this research. 
 
In the next two chapters, selected best practices will be analysed for recommendations 
when implementing ISA programmes and selected laws and regulations will be 
analysed for the requirements imposed on banks when implementing ISA 
programmes aimed at the home users of online banking. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In industry, organisations attempt to outdo their competitors and gain a competitive 
edge by providing a better service or product than their rivals. The methods and 
procedures adopted to provide services or manufacture products are constantly 
reviewed and improved over time in an effort to find an optimal way of doing things. 
Those methods and procedures which were considered at the time to produce the most 
desirable outcome become known as industry best practice. A best practice may be 
defined as a procedure or method which is known to achieve the best possible results 
(BusinessDictionary, 2011; Methods & Tools QA Resources, 2009; Wikipedia, 
2010
b
). In this chapter, the focus is on information security best practices and 
international standards. Information security best practices and international standards 
are important for effective information security governance (von Solms & von Solms, 
2004). Banking organisations implement best practices for a number of reasons which 
include improving customer confidence in the banks’ security programmes and 
ensuring that their information security programmes are at a standard where, should a 
security breach occur, the bank concerned will be able to demonstrate due care and 
due diligence and, thus, avoid financial and legal consequences (von Solms & von 
Solms, 2004; Williams, 2008).  
 
This chapter will investigate the recommendations proffered by internationally 
recognised information security best practices or standards to organisations in respect 
of user awareness. In addition, the criteria for the selection of these best practices or 
international standards will be defined.  
4.2 Documents to be Analysed 
 
The objective of the analysis is to compile a list of recommendations which 
organisations could implement when striving to comply with international 
information security best practices. This chapter discusses the background to each 
best practice selected, the objective of the best practice and its structure. User 
awareness recommendations are extracted from each best practice and interpreted in a 
way which may be relevant to an information security awareness (ISA) programme 
aimed at the home users of online banking.  
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The criteria for the selection of the best practices to be included in this research 
include the following: 
 
 it must be an internationally accepted information or information security 
standard which may be implemented in a banking organisation. 
 it must be available to the public. 
 
For each selected best practice, recommendations relevant to user awareness are 
extracted and interpreted in the context of an ISA programme aimed at the home users 
of online banking. These recommendations are presented in tables specific to each 
selected best practice.   
 
The best practices or international standards identified include the following: 
 
 COBIT (Version 4.1) 
 ISO/IEC 27001 
 Standard of Good Practice for Information Security (2007) 
 
Despite the fact that this list is not exhaustive the sources are considered sufficient for 
the purposes of this research. 
  
4.3 Compiling the Best Practice Recommendations List 
 
In this section, each best practice selected is introduced and its background described. 
Thereafter, a table is presented which displays the recommendations identified that 
banks should adopt in their endeavours to comply with the selected best practice. 
These recommendations are interpreted in the context of an ISA programme aimed at 
the home users of online banking. All the tables are then consolidated into one 
“recommendations” table. This latter table lists the best practice recommendations 
and the corresponding best practice control references, thus facilitating the 
identification of which international standard covers which recommendation. Finally, 
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a table listing the best practice recommendations only is presented. This table 
constitutes the best practice recommendations list.  
4.3.1 COBIT 4.1 
 
COBIT 4.1 was an incremental update to COBIT 4.0 and was released in 2007. It was 
also preceded by COBIT 3
rd
 Edition, published in July 2000. COBIT is an acronym 
for Control Objectives for Information and related Technology. The mission of 
COBIT is to create a current, international IT governance control framework which is 
publicly available for use in organisations. Business managers of organisations and IT 
and assurance professionals comprise the target audience for this standard. COBIT 
adopts a process-oriented approach with control objectives defined for each process.  
There are 34 processes grouped in the four COBIT domains. These domains include 
Plan and Organise, Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support, and Monitor and 
Evaluate. However, not all processes necessarily apply to one single organisation. 
Although COBIT 4.1 also offers guidance on aspects such as assigning accountability 
and performance metrics this research study will only go as far as the control 
requirements. COBIT presents the control objectives an organisation should satisfy 
rather than the steps an organisation can take to satisfy these control objectives.  It is 
up to the organisation to identify its needs, select relevant COBIT processes and 
implement controls in a manner that will be effective in the organisation concerned 
and also meet the control objectives.  
 
COBIT is applicable to all organisations − worldwide − which require and/or 
implement IT controls. A history of COBIT implementations lists multiple industries 
around the globe which have implemented COBIT (Ridley, Young & Carroll, 2004). 
It is suggested that an organisation refer to COBIT should the organisation need to 
align its IT with its business objectives. COBIT has been referred to in numerous 
published articles, in particular, articles addressing information and information 
technology governance and control. These articles include: 
 
 “COBIT: a methodology for managing and controlling information and 
information technology risks and vulnerabilities” (Lainhart, 2000) 
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 “IT governance hands-on: using COBIT to implement IT governance” 
(Kordel, 2004) 
 “Information security governance: COBIT or ISO 17799 or both?” (von 
Solms, 2005) 
 “Using IT governance and COBIT to deliver value with IT and respond to 
legal, regulatory and compliance challenges” (Hardy, 2006)  
 
COBIT may be used to mould the entire security posture of an organisation. However, 
for the purpose of this research, the focus will be on the security process which deals 
specifically with end user training and education. Attention will also be paid to related 
COBIT processes which act as inputs to this process. Control objectives will be 
analysed and interpreted in the context of this research under the “Applicability” 
column. See Table 4-1 for COBIT 4.1 control recommendations. 
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Table 4-1 COBIT 4.1 recommendations 
Domain 
Process 
Reference 
Process Name and 
Description 
Control 
Objective 
Reference 
Control Objective 
Description 
Applicability 
Deliver 
and 
Support 
DS7 
Effective education of all 
users of IT systems 
DS7.1 
Identification of education 
and training needs 
Banks should conduct assessments in order to 
identify those issues of which the home users 
of online banking need to be made aware, such 
as threats, countermeasures, consequences of a 
breach, incident reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
   DS7.2 
Delivery of training and 
education 
Banks should identify the home users of online 
banking as a target audience and decide how to 
deliver the awareness information to the 
members of this audience. (Delivery methods 
are outside the scope of this research). 
   
DS7.3 Evaluation of training 
received 
Banks should conduct surveys on security 
awareness amongst the home users of online 
banking after the implementation of an ISA 
programme. This should serve as an input for 
improving the subsequent ISA programme.  
Plan and 
Organise 
PO7 
Input to DS7: Users’ skills 
and competencies, 
including individual training; 
specific 
training requirements 
  This process is aimed at managing the human 
resources within an organisation and ensuring 
they are competent users of the organisation’s 
IT systems. In the context of this research, this 
process is applicable as it recommends that the 
bank formally identify those aspects that the 
home users of online banking need to be 
educated on. Such aspects may include threats, 
countermeasures and incident reporting 
procedures.  
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Domain 
Process 
Reference 
Process Name and 
Description 
Control 
Objective 
Reference 
Control Objective 
Description 
Applicability 
Acquire 
and 
Implement 
AI4 
Input to DS7: Training 
materials, knowledge 
transfer 
requirements for solution 
implementation 
  This process includes control objective AI4.3 
which deals with knowledge transfer to end 
users. Banks should ensure their ISA 
programmes include current information on 
threats and countermeasures and that this 
information is transferred to the home users of 
online banking. 
Deliver 
and 
Support 
DS1 
Input to DS7: Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) 
  This process deals with internal service level 
agreements between IT and business. Banks 
should commit to a predetermined turnaround 
time for responses to incidents or concerns 
reported by the home users of online banking. 
Home users should be made aware of incident 
reporting procedures and the expected response 
times through ISA programmes. 
Deliver 
and 
Support 
DS5 
Input to DS7: Specific 
training requirements on 
security awareness 
  This process deals with the need to manage 
security. Part of security management entails an 
increase in security awareness. Although 
training does not fall within the scope of this 
research, banks should identify, and make 
home users aware of, the threats they face 
during online banking, what they are able to do 
to protect themselves and how they should 
report incidents. 
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Domain 
Process 
Reference 
Process Name and 
Description 
Control 
Objective 
Reference 
Control Objective 
Description 
Applicability 
Deliver 
and 
Support 
DS8 
Input to DS7: User 
satisfaction reports 
  Banks should conduct a survey amongst home 
users on their level of satisfaction with the 
response to reported online banking incidents. 
The results should be used to improve the 
incident response procedure. Home users of 
online banking should be made aware of new 
incident reporting procedures and incident 
response times. 
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4.3.2 ISO/IEC 27001 
 
The ISO 27000 series consists of ISO 27001 and ISO 27002. BS7799 was a standard 
published in 1995, which then evolved into ISO/IEC 17799:2005 − published in 
December 2000. This standard was renamed ISO 27002 and published on 16 June 
2005. BS 7799-2 was published in 1998 and evolved into ISO 27001, published on 18 
October 2005. ISO 27001 is aligned with ISO 27002. ISO 27002 supports ISO 27001 
by offering implementation guidance for the control recommendations set out in ISO 
27001 (ISO 27000 Directory, 2010). An organisation is said to be certified against 
ISO 27001. ISO 27001 consists of 11 control sections, 39 control objectives, and 134 
controls. ISO 27001 contains the recommendations for establishing an information 
security management system. These recommendations are mandatory should an 
organisation wish to be certified against this standard. In view of the fact that an 
organisation is officially credited with the control objectives and controls as set out in 
ISO 27001, for the purposes of this research, the focus will be on these control 
objectives and controls as set out in ISO 27001.  
 
ISO 27001 controls are applicable to most organisations in most environments. 
Typically, organisations which implement ISO 27001 include the following: 
 
 organisations that view information and the related technology as important 
business assets 
 organisations which want adequate security measures in place to minimise 
security risks, for example, the protection of trade secrets and client 
information 
 organisations which enable online business services such as online banking 
 
ISO 27001 was developed by business organisations such as Marks & Spencer, 
Unilever, Lloyds TSB and Nationwide Building Society. Lloyds TSB and Nationwide 
Building Society are both financial institutions. While it is possible to comply with 
the standard, proof of compliance through an accredited body provides a way of 
showing partners, suppliers, staff and customers that the organisation concerned is  
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taking a stern approach to the management of information security (Adviza 
Consultants, 2009). 
 
ISO 27001 has been referred to in numerous books and articles, in particular, those 
addressing information security risks and management. These articles include: 
 
 “State-of-the-art information security management systems with ISO/IEC 
27001:2005” (Humphreys, 2006) 
 “Information security requirements: interpreting the legislative aspects” 
(Gerber & von Solms, 2008) 
 “Emerging issues in IT governance: implementing the corporate risks IT 
management model” (Spremic & Popovic, 2008) 
 “Information security based on ISO 27001/ISO 17799: a management guide”, 
(Calder, 2009)  
 
The objective of ISO 27001 is to guide the creation of an effective information 
security management system within an organisation which is aimed at the employees 
and at protecting both the organisation and its information assets. ISO 27001 also 
includes those contractors and third party users who require access to an 
organisation’s information technology and information assets.  It does not explicitly 
mention home users. Nevertheless, home users may be regarded as the end users of 
the internet banking service in the same way that employees may be regarded as the 
end users of an organisation’s systems and applications. Accordingly, controls which 
pertain to end user security awareness will be included in this research study. Control 
objectives and the associated controls will be analysed and interpreted in the context 
of this research under the “Applicability” column. See Table 4-2 for ISO 27001 
control recommendations. 
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Table 4-2 ISO/IEC 27001 Recommendations 
Control Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Control 
Objective 
Reference 
and Name 
Control Objective 
Control 
Reference and 
Name 
Control Description Applicability 
A.8 – Human 
resources 
security 
A.8.2 – 
During 
Employment 
To ensure employees, 
contractors and third party 
users are aware of 
information security 
threats and concerns, their 
responsibilities and 
liabilities, and are 
equipped to support 
organisational security 
policy in the course of 
their normal work and to 
reduce the risk of human 
error. 
A.8.2.2 – 
Information 
security 
awareness, 
education and 
training  
All employees of the 
organisation and, where 
relevant, contractors and 
third party users should 
receive appropriate 
awareness training and 
regular updates in 
organisational policies 
and procedures, as 
relevant to their job 
function. 
 
Banks should identify the home users of 
online banking as a target audience for 
an ISA programme and, through this ISA 
programme, these home users should be 
made aware of the threats they face as 
online bankers, countermeasures they 
may implement and an incident reporting 
procedure they may follow. 
A.10 – 
Communications 
and operations 
management 
A.10.4 – 
Protection 
against 
malicious and 
mobile code 
To protect the integrity of 
software and information 
A.10.4.1 – 
Controls 
against 
malicious code 
Detection, prevention, 
and recovery controls to 
protect against malicious 
code and appropriate 
user awareness 
procedures should be 
implemented 
Banks should make the home users of 
online banking aware of ways in which 
they may protect their information by 
enabling them to identify hacking 
attempts, countermeasures they may 
implement to prevent malicious code 
from being installed on their computers 
and incident reporting procedures. 
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Control Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Control 
Objective 
Reference 
and Name 
Control Objective 
Control 
Reference and 
Name 
Control Description Applicability 
A.10 – 
Communications 
and operations 
management 
A.10.8 – 
Exchange of 
information 
To maintain the security 
of the information and 
software exchanged within 
an organisation and with 
any external entity. 
A10.8.1 –
Information 
exchange 
policies and 
procedures 
Formal exchange 
policies, procedures, and 
controls should be in 
place to protect the 
exchange of information 
through the use of all 
types of communication 
facilities. 
 
Banks should make the home users of 
online banking aware of ways in which 
they may protect their information by 
enabling them to identify hacking 
attempts such as phishing, social 
engineering and installation of malicious 
code and also of the countermeasures 
they may implement, such as personal 
firewalls and antivirus software. 
A.13 – 
Information 
security incident 
management 
A.13.1 – 
Reporting 
information 
security 
incidents and 
weaknesses  
To ensure information 
security events and 
weaknesses associated 
with information systems 
are communicated in a 
manner allowing timely 
corrective action to be 
taken. 
A.13.1.1 – 
Reporting 
information 
security events 
Information security 
events should be 
reported through 
appropriate management 
channels as quickly as 
possible. 
Banks should make home users aware of 
the procedure they should follow when 
reporting either an information security 
incident or else a breach of their online 
banking account. 
A.13 – 
Information 
security incident 
management 
A.13.2 – 
Management 
of 
information 
security 
incidents and 
improvements  
To ensure a consistent and 
effective approach is 
applied to the 
management of 
information security 
incidents 
A.13.2.1 – 
Responsibilities 
and procedures 
Management 
responsibilities and 
procedures shall be 
established to ensure a 
quick, effective and 
orderly response to 
information security 
incidents. 
Banks should make home users aware of 
both the procedure to follow should they 
need to report a breach in their online 
banking account and also the expected 
response times. 
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4.3.3 The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security 
 
The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security is produced by the 
Information Security Forum (ISF). The standard was first released in 1996. However, 
the version referred to in this research was released in 2007. The standard is updated 
every two years and its main objectives include 
 
 meeting the security needs of leading international organisations 
 improving information security best practices 
 demonstrating thought leadership and addressing the latest security topics 
 leveraging off and aligning with international standards such as ISO 27002 
and COBIT v4.1. 
 
The standard consists of the following 6 aspects: Security Management (enterprise-
wide), Critical Business Applications, Computer Installations, Networks, Systems 
Development and End User Environment. Each aspect is divided into areas with each 
area consisting of sections and statements. This research will focus on the aspect of 
End User Environment. The target audience for the End User Environment aspect 
includes individuals in the end user environment as well as information security co-
ordinators and managers. 
 
The standard may be implemented in any organisation which wants to improve its 
level of security and reduce its levels of risk by promoting good security practices. 
 
The standard has been referred to in those published articles which mainly address the 
assessment of information security within organisations. These articles include 
 
 “Information security policy: what do international information security 
standards say?” (Höne & Eloff, 2002) 
 “Assessment of enterprise information security: an architecture theory diagram 
definition” (Johansson & Johnson, 2005) 
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 “A prototype for assessing information security awareness” (Kruger & 
Kearney, 2006) 
 “Information security standards focus on the existence of process, not its 
content” (Siponen, 2006)  
 
Despite the fact that the standard does not explicitly mention home users, for the 
purpose of this research, the content which addresses user awareness amongst end 
users will be analysed. The objective of each section of the standard may be seen as a 
control objective with the statements being seen as controls. Sections and statements 
will be analysed and interpreted in the context of this research under the 
“Applicability” column. See Table 4-3 for the control recommendations as set out by 
the Standard of Good Practice for Information Security. 
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Table 4-3 The Standard of Good Practice for Information Security recommendations 
Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Section Principle Section Objective 
Statement 
Reference 
Applicability 
UE1.2 – 
Security 
awareness 
Users should be 
made aware of the 
key elements of 
information security 
and why it is 
needed, and 
understand their 
personal 
information security 
responsibilities. 
To ensure users 
apply security 
controls and prevent 
important 
information from 
being compromised 
or disclosed to 
unauthorised 
individuals. 
UE1.2.1 
This statement addresses increasing the awareness on the part of 
employees, contractors and third party users of the organisation’s 
systems and also enabling them to demonstrate compliance with the 
organisational information security policy. Despite the fact that it does 
not explicitly mention home users, however, a bank should make home 
users aware of, and also require them to comply with, certain security 
recommendations before signing up for online banking. Such 
recommendations may involve installing antivirus software or ensuring 
that a strong password is chosen.  
   UE1.2.2 
Banks should ensure that the security awareness programme reaches all 
the home users of online banking. 
   
UE1.2.3 Banks should ensure that the ISA programme succeeds in making home 
users aware of the information security policy, the importance of both 
information security and compliance with security recommendations, 
the consequences of non-compliance as well as measures home users 
may take to protect themselves. 
   UE1.2.4 This statement deals with employees being overheard discussing 
business information in public places. Banks should make home users 
aware of the consequences should they divulge confidential information 
pertinent to their online banking account. 
   UE1.2.5 Banks should make home users aware of the threats they face as online 
bankers, how to identify these threats and the countermeasures they may 
implement in order to protect themselves. 
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Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Section Principle Section Objective 
Statement 
Reference 
Applicability 
   UE1.2.6 Banks should ensure home users know how to keep information 
pertinent to their online banking account confidential. For example, 
home users should be warned not to compromise their passwords by 
writing them down. 
   UE1.2.7 Banks should ensure home users are aware of, and implement, security 
controls when conducting online banking. Such controls include the 
selection of a strong password for their online banking account as well 
as installing and updating antivirus software.  
UE1.3 – User 
training 
Users should be 
trained in how to 
run systems 
correctly and how to 
develop and apply 
security controls. 
To provide users 
with the skills 
required to protect 
systems and fulfil 
their information 
security  
responsibilities. 
UE1.3.1 Banks should offer, and make home users aware of, a tutorial on how 
home users may set up and secure their online banking accounts.  
   UE1.3.2 Banks should make home users aware of the countermeasures they may 
implement and how to implement these countermeasures. 
   UE1.3.3 Not applicable to this research. 
UE1.4 – Local 
security co-
ordination 
An individual 
should be appointed 
to co-ordinate 
information security 
activities in the end 
user 
environment. 
To ensure that 
security activities 
are carried out in a 
timely and accurate 
manner, and that 
security 
issues are resolved 
effectively. 
UE1.4.1 Banks should make home users aware that an individual has been 
assigned the responsibility of carrying out the ISA programme aimed at 
the home users of online banking. This will, in turn, help create the 
impression that that the bank is concerned about the safety of its online 
bankers. 
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Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Section Principle Section Objective 
Statement 
Reference 
Applicability 
   UE1.4.2 Not applicable to this research. 
   UE1.4.3 Banks should make home users aware that a competent team has been 
assigned to implementing the ISA programme aimed at the home users 
of online banking. 
   UE1.4.4 Banks should make home users aware that the team responsible for the 
ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking meet on a 
regular basis to discuss improvements and updates to the ISA 
programme. 
UE5.1 – General 
controls 
The use of 
electronic 
communications (eg 
e-mail, instant 
messaging, Internet 
access, voice over 
IP or wireless 
access) should be 
supported by setting 
policy covering the 
types of 
communication 
permitted, and 
promoting user 
awareness of the 
security issues 
associated with their 
use. 
To ensure that the 
organisation’s 
reputation is not 
damaged as a result 
of the transmission 
of 
inappropriate 
information, that the 
content of electronic 
communications is 
accurate, and that 
business activity is 
not disrupted by the 
introduction of 
malware. 
UE5.1.1 Banks should make home users aware of how to distinguish between 
legitimate email messages and those email messages which are attempts 
at social engineering, phishing or the installation of malware. 
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Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Section Principle Section Objective 
Statement 
Reference 
Applicability 
   UE5.1.2 Not applicable to this research. 
   UE5.1.3 Banks should ensure that home users are aware of the security features 
available to apply to their outgoing email and how to control incoming 
email. 
UE6.1 – 
Information 
privacy 
Approved methods 
for handling 
personally 
identifiable 
information should 
be established 
and applied. 
To prevent 
information about 
individuals being 
used in an 
inappropriate 
manner, and to 
ensure 
compliance with 
legislative and 
regulatory 
requirements for 
information privacy. 
UE6.1.1 Banks should make home users aware of what action they may take to 
ensure the information privacy of sensitive information which is 
pertinent to their online banking account. 
   UE6.1.2 Not applicable to this research. 
   UE6.1.3 Banks should make home users aware of the sound practices 
implemented by the banks when handling home users’ personal 
information so as to ensure peace of mind and confidence in the bank 
itself.  
   UE6.1.4 Banks should make home users aware of the relevant legislation they 
comply to when handling the home users’ personal information. 
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Section 
Reference and 
Name 
Section Principle Section Objective 
Statement 
Reference 
Applicability 
UE6.2 – 
Information 
security incident 
management 
Information security 
incidents should be 
identified, 
responded to, 
recovered from, and 
followed up 
using an 
information security 
incident 
management 
process. 
To identify and 
resolve information 
security incidents 
effectively, 
minimise their 
business impact 
and reduce the risk 
of similar 
information security 
incidents occurring. 
UE6.2.1 Banks should make home users aware of the procedures they should 
follow when reporting an information security incident such as a 
phishing attack or a breach of their online banking account. Home users 
should be aware of expected response times and the feedback they may 
expect to receive upon resolution of the incident.  
   UE6.2.2 Banks should make home users aware of whom to contact when 
reporting an information security incident. In addition, banks should log 
reports and classify them according to the severity. 
   UE6.2.3 Not applicable to this research. 
   UE6.2.4 Not applicable to this research. 
   UE6.2.5 Banks should make home users aware that they will receive feedback 
once their information security incident has been resolved. 
   UE6.2.6 Security incidents should be reviewed and this information used to 
update any subsequent ISA programmes aimed at the home users of 
online banking. 
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4.4 The Best Practice Recommendations List 
 
The most frequently mentioned recommendations are all aimed at making users aware 
of the threats they face, how they may counteract these threats and also of procedures 
for reporting incidents. Table 4-4 presents a summary of the recommendations with 
relevant best practice references mapped to each recommendation. The best practice 
recommendations include the following: 
 
 Banks should identify what the home users of online banking need to be made 
aware of through the medium of an ISA programme, for example,  threats and 
countermeasures. 
 Banks should identify the home users of online banking as a target audience 
for user awareness programmes and also ensure that awareness materials reach 
all home users of online banking. 
 Banks should conduct surveys on security awareness amongst the home users 
of online banking after the implementation of an ISA programme. These 
findings should serve as an input for improving the next ISA programme. 
 Banks should make home users aware of incident reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
 Banks should conduct a survey amongst home users on their level of 
satisfaction with the response to reported online banking incidents. These 
results should be used to improve the incident response procedure.  In addition, 
the home users of online banking should be made aware of new incident 
reporting procedures and incident response times. 
 Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of ways in which 
they may protect their information. 
 Banks should make home users aware of, and require them to comply with, 
certain security requirements stipulated in an information security policy 
before signing up for online banking. 
 Banks should demonstrate to the home users of online banking that they take a 
stern approach to information security management and awareness.
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Table 4-4 Best Practice Recommendations Summary 
 BEST PRACTICE / INTERNATIONAL STANDARD REFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 
COBIT 4.1 
(Control Objective Reference) 
ISO 27001 
(Control Reference) 
The Standard of Good Practice 
for Information Security 
(Statement Reference) 
Banks should identify what home users of online 
banking need to be made aware of through the ISA 
programme, such as threats and countermeasures 
(DS7.1)  
(PO7 – Input to DS7)  
(DS5 – Input to DS7) 
(A.8.2.2) 
(UE1.2.3) 
(UE1.2.5) 
(UE1.2.7) 
(UE1.3.2) 
(UE5.1.1) 
(UE5.1.3) 
Banks should identify the home users of online 
banking as a target audience for user awareness 
programmes and also ensure that awareness 
materials reach all home users of online banking 
(DS7.2)  
(AI4 – Input to DS7) 
(A.8.2.2) (UE1.2.2) 
Banks should conduct surveys on security awareness 
amongst the home users of online banking after the 
implementation of an ISA programme. These 
findings should serve as an input for improving the 
next ISA programme 
(DS7.3)   
Banks should make home users aware of incident 
reporting procedures and expected response times (DS1 – Input to DS7) 
(A.13.1.1) 
(A.13.2.1) 
(UE6.2.1) 
(UE6.2.2) 
(UE6.2.5) 
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 BEST PRACTICE / INTERNATIONAL STANDARD REFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATION 
COBIT 4.1 
(Control Objective Reference) 
ISO 27001 
(Control Reference) 
The Standard of Good Practice 
for Information Security 
(Statement Reference) 
Banks should conduct a survey amongst home users 
on their level of satisfaction with the response to 
reported online banking incidents. These results 
should be used to improve the incident response 
procedure. In addition, the home users of online 
banking should be made aware of new incident 
reporting procedures and incident response times 
(DS8 – Input to DS7)  (UE6.2.6) 
Banks should make the home users of online 
banking aware of ways in which they may protect 
their information 
 
(A.10.4.1) 
(A.10.8.1) 
(UE1.2.4) 
(UE1.2.6) 
(UE1.3.1) 
(UE6.1.1) 
Banks should make home users aware of, and 
require them to comply with, certain security 
requirements stipulated in an information security 
policy before signing up for online banking 
  
(UE1.2.1) 
(UE1.2.3) 
Banks should demonstrate to the home users of 
online banking that they take a stern approach to 
information security management and awareness   
(UE1.4.1) 
(UE1.4.3) 
(UE1.4.4) 
(UE6.1.3) 
(UE6.1.4) 
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4.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, a number of selected, internationally recognised information security 
best practices were identified and an investigation undertaken to ascertain what 
recommendations these international standards offer to organisations regarding user 
awareness. Each requirement was analysed to gain an understanding of what an ISA 
programme aimed at the home users of online banking would need to include to 
satisfy best practice recommendations. The final result comprised a list of information 
security best practices which should be implemented when devising an ISA 
programme aimed at the home users of online banking. Despite the fact that the list of 
selected best practices is not exhaustive it is, nevertheless, sufficient as it satisfies the 
criteria for appropriate best practices for this research. 
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 5, a similar investigation is undertaken, but with the focus 
on the requirements which selected laws and regulations, pertinent to South African 
banks, impose on banks in respect of home user awareness. These requirements are 
extracted and analysed to gain an understanding of what the content of an ISA 
programme aimed at home users of online banking would need to include to satisfy 
these legal requirements. The culmination of this chapter is a final list of legal 
requirements which a bank must fulfil through an ISA programme aimed at the home 
users of online banking. In Chapter 6, a comparison is made between the best practice 
recommendations identified and the legal requirements identified to uncover any 
significant gaps between the two. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5:  
5 Information Security Awareness Legislation 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The Internet provides the infrastructure for various online products and services 
aimed at home users with access to the Internet. These products and services include 
online banking which is a form of banking affording home users the opportunity to 
complete banking transactions online, for example, transferring money and paying 
accounts. Online banking is convenient, but has numerous information security threats 
associated with its use − see Chapter 3. The existence of these information security 
threats and their consequences has motivated the need for regulation within the 
banking industry. Accordingly, information security has, increasingly, become the 
subject of national and global legislation (Gerber & von Solms, 2008).  In Chapter 4, 
selected information security best practices and international standards were analysed 
for information security awareness (ISA) recommendations. In this chapter, the legal 
requirements for information security awareness in selected legal documents are 
analysed. The aim of this analysis is to identify the obligations which South African 
banks have towards the home users of online banking when implementing an ISA 
programme.  
 
There is a close link between information security best practice and the legal 
requirements for information security, thus making it difficult to separate the two 
(British Standards Institution, 2005; King Committee on Governance, 2009). For 
example, in control section A.15, international best practice ISO/IEC27001 deals with 
compliance with legal requirements, including laws, regulations, statutes and 
contractual obligations. In this vein, compliance with legal requirements may be 
achieved by implementing best practice recommendations, for example, the 
implementation of COBIT to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley. Compliance ensures that, 
should a legal breach occur, the organisation concerned will be able to demonstrate 
due care and due diligence, and, thus, avoid both financial and legal consequences 
(von Solms & von Solms, 2004; Williams, 2008). 
5.2 Documents to be Analysed 
 
The objective of the analysis is to draw up a list of the legal requirements which it is 
incumbent on South African banks when implementing an ISA programme aimed at 
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the home users of online banking. The documents consulted in this chapter include 
selected laws, regulations, statutes and contractual obligations which have 
information security implications for South African banks. A law refers to a rule or 
system of rules imposed by a government to regulate society and it normally carries 
consequences for noncompliance. Laws include regulations − imposed and 
maintained by a relevant authority − and statutes, which are written laws such as an 
Act and which are formally passed by a legal body. Laws may also enforce 
contractual obligations, which are acts a party is obliged to perform, as stated in a 
contract (Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 2011
a
; Oxford English Dictionary, 2011
a
).  
 
This chapter offers both an introduction and a description of its objective for each 
selected law, regulation, statute and contractual obligation. Information security 
requirements are extracted and analysed for the obligations which South African 
banks have towards the home users of online banking when implementing an ISA 
programme. 
 
Mra Khwar Nyo is an attorney and Certified Information Privacy Professional 
(International Association of Privacy Professionals) working in the Security and 
Privacy Services team at Deloitte & Touche, South Africa. Mra was consulted for her 
opinion as to which legislation should be included in this research. She recommended 
international banking legislation and South African legislation and also suggested 
other relevant documents. A visit to the South African government’s website for 
documents available to the public was carried out to research other pertinent 
documents and to identify relevant amendments to the final list of documents. The 
legislation identified includes the following: 
 
 Basel II 
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 
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 The Code of Banking Practice 
 Consumer Protection Act, 2008 
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (King III), 25 February, 2009 
 Electronic Communications Act, 2005 
 
The selected documents listed will now be analysed in detail for the ISA requirements 
which they impose on banks.  
5.3 Compiling the Legal Requirements List 
 
In this section, each legal document is introduced, described and analysed for 
requirements. These requirements are illustrated in a table which presents the legal 
requirements which the legal documents impose on banks when the banks implement 
an ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. Depending on the 
activities of the bank, the applicability of the legal requirements may vary. For 
example, Basel II is applicable to banks which carry out international activities. For 
this reason, the list of legal requirements will be sectioned into the relevant laws, 
regulations, statutes and contractual obligations.   
 
This sectioned list of legal requirements was merged and duplicates removed. The 
resultant list is then compared to the final list of best practice recommendations as 
identified in Chapter 4. Any overlaps and gaps are identified and presented in Chapter 
6. For this merged table, the assumption is that the bank would need to comply with 
all the legal requirements as identified in this research. 
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5.3.1 BASEL II 
 
Basel II is a framework presented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
and relevant to all banks which conduct international business activities (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). Basel II offers recommendations for 
national banking regulators worldwide when regulating the calculation of capital 
requirements for banks. Basel II encourages banks to adopt a risk management 
approach to business. The fact that Basel II focuses on operational risk and classifies 
information security as part of the operational risk management system is important in 
the context of this research. The Basel Committee has identified operational risks 
which have the potential to cause significant losses. These operational risks include 
fiduciary breaches, theft by employees, misuse of confidential customer information 
and hacking (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). For the purposes of 
this research, hacking constitutes the relevant operational risk. Operational risk falls 
under Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirements of Basel II.  For guidance on 
operational risk management, the Basel Committee refers to the document “Sound 
practices for the management and supervision of operational risk”, February 2003. In 
this document, the committee has categorised operational risk events.  “External 
Fraud”, which includes damages from hacking, is the category which is relevant to 
this research.  
 
Pillar III: Market Discipline imposes disclosure requirements on banks within each 
risk area, including operational risk. The Pillar I guidance document “Sound Practices 
for the management and supervision of operational risk” and paragraph 824 of Pillar 
III will be analysed for the requirements they impose on banks when banks implement 
an ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. These requirements 
are presented in Table 5-1.   
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Table 5-1 BASEL II Requirements 
Reference Requirement 
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 1, paragraph 12 
Banks should make home users aware of their approach to identifying and mitigating risks facing them 
when participating in online banking.  
 
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 1, paragraph 15 
Banks should review risks facing home users of online banking and make appropriate changes to its risk 
mitigating processes, including the content of the ISA programme.   
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 2, paragraphs 16 and 17 
Banks should assure home users of online banking that the effectiveness of controls implemented to 
mitigate risks facing them are reviewed by an independent auditor. 
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 4, paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 
Banks should identify all risks facing home users of online banking and make home users aware of how 
they can mitigate these risks.  
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 5, paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29 and 
30 
Banks should implement controls to mitigate new threats to home users of online banking and, where 
appropriate, update the ISA programme to include these new threats. 
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Reference Requirement 
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 6, paragraphs 32, 34, 37 and 38 
 The board of directors and senior management at banks should demonstrate to the public a stern 
stance on information security 
 Banks should make home users of online banking aware of information security technology they 
can implement to mitigate risks, and, where possible, make this technology available to home 
users.  An example of such a technology would be software which checks the home user’s 
antivirus software and notifies the home user if it offers sufficient protection when online banking  
“Sound practices for the management and 
supervision of operational risk”, February 
2003 
 
Principle 1, paragraphs 50 and 51 
The bank should make timely and frequent public disclosures of information which will assist the public 
to determine how effective a bank is at risk identification, assessment, monitoring and control. 
BASEL II, June 2004, paragraph 824 
General qualitative disclosure requirement 
Banks must describe their risk management objectives and policies. 
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Basel II requires banks to adopt a risk management approach to business. Information 
security is addressed through the implementation of an effective operational risk 
management framework which is supported by senior management. Despite the fact 
that Basel II does not explicitly include a requirement for an ISA programme aimed at 
the home users of online banking it does, however, imply this in its requirement in 
respect of the identification and management of risks associated with external fraud 
and banking products. Banks may consult security best practices/international 
standards for guidance on risk mitigation, which reveal the need for an effective ISA 
programme.   
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5.3.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, referred to in this section as “the Act”, was created 
in response to a number of corporate fraud cases. The main objective of this Act is to 
hold the board of directors responsible for the release of financial reports which 
accurately present and validate the performance of an organisation (The Institute of 
Internal Auditors, 2008). The Act is pertinent to all American and international 
companies with registered equity or debt securities with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Included in its requirements, the Act requires compliance with a set of 
internal controls to ensure accurate financial reporting (SOX-online, 2009). Section 
404 of the Act is concerned with management’s assessment of the internal controls 
over financial reporting. Firstly, management is made formally accountable for 
implementing and maintaining an effective internal control structure. Secondly, 
Section 404 requires that this internal control structure be independently audited at the 
end of each fiscal year. Several business processes rely on information technology 
(Ugochuku, 2006) which necessitates that the internal control structure incorporates 
an information security aspect.  
 
Computer controls in scope for the assessment of the internal control structure include 
general computer controls and application controls. General controls are those 
controls which ensure that the information output of an information technology (IT) 
system is accurate for financial reporting (SANS, 2011). General controls in scope for 
an audit of the internal control structure are those which support application controls 
which have a bearing on accurate financial reporting. General computer controls 
which are designed for the effectiveness and efficiency of business operations are 
excluded from the audit (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2008).  Application 
controls refer to those automated controls within the software applications which are 
used either to create or make changes to data for the purposes of financial reporting 
(SANS, 2011).   
 
The Act does not explicitly address the ISA requirements imposed on banks. 
However, there are certain guidance documents which do mention awareness, for 
example, efforts to make management and employees aware of the security policy and 
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their responsibilities when enforcing controls within the organisation (SANS, 2011; 
The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2008). The Act would require the implementation 
of an ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking if the systems which 
facilitate online banking were justified as within scope of the audit of the internal 
control structure for accurate financial reporting, the Section 404 assessment and if 
the scope of key controls included the implementation of such a programme. A key 
control refers to a control that, should it fail, will result in a material error in the 
financial reports.  Key controls preventing fraud should be considered in scope only if 
such fraud would result in a material misstatement of the financials.  A misstatement is 
considered material if it would affect the decision of a reasonable person who was 
considering investing in the bank concerned (The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2008). 
 
For the purposes of this research, it is assumed both that the systems supporting 
online banking are considered in scope for the Section 404 assessment and that the 
key controls identified include the implementation of an awareness programme aimed 
at the home users of online banking. If a bank were to meet the control requirements, 
the bank could implement the relevant COBIT controls (The Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2008; Ugochuku, 2006). Drawing from Chapter 4, the requirements 
imposed on banks when satisfying a Section 404 assessment on its online banking 
system, with the implementation of an ISA programme aimed at the home users of 
online banking identified as a key control, are presented in Table 5-2.     
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Table 5-2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Requirements 
Reference Requirement 
COBIT 4.1 
 
Control Objective References: 
DS7.1  
PO7 – Input to DS7  
DS5 – Input to DS7 
Banks should identify what home users of online banking need to be made aware of through the ISA 
programme, such as threats and countermeasure 
COBIT 4.1 
 
Control Objective References: 
DS7.2  
AI4 – Input to DS7 
Banks should identify home users of online banking as a target audience for user awareness programmes and 
ensure awareness materials reach all home users of online banking 
COBIT 4.1 
 
Control Objective References: 
DS7.3 
Banks should conduct surveys on security awareness amongst home users of online banking after the 
implementation of an ISA programme.  This should serve as an input for improving the next ISA programme 
COBIT 4.1 
 
Control Objective References: 
DS1 – Input to DS7 
Banks should make home users aware of incident reporting procedures and expected response times 
COBIT 4.1 
 
Control Objective References: 
DS8 – Input to DS7 
Banks should conduct a survey amongst home users on how satisfied they are with the response to reported 
online banking incidents.  The results should be used to improve the incident response procedure.  Home users 
of online banking should be made aware of new incident reporting procedures and incident response times 
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5.3.3 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited financial institutions from functioning as 
commercial banks, investment banks and insurance companies in one. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, referred to in this section as “the GLB Act” − also known 
as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 − was intended to repeal the 
Glass-Steagall Act. By allowing the combination of commercial banking, investment 
banking and insurance services under one service provider the enactment of the GLB 
Act meant that the American financial industry was able to become more competitive 
within the global market (Neale & Peterson, 2005). Like Basel II and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 is relevant to those banks 
which conduct international banking activities.  
 
The privacy of online transactions and personal information are not only matters of 
major concern but they also constitute barriers to the acceptance of online banking on 
the part of home users (Gikandi & Bloor, 2009; Laukkanen, Sinkkonen & Laukkanen, 
2009). Compliance requirements for privacy and security of client information are 
addressed by the GLB Act through the Financial Privacy Rule, the Safeguards Rule 
and Pretexting Protection. The Financial Privacy Rule and the Safeguards Rule are 
addressed by Subtitle A: Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information while 
Pretexting Protection is addressed by Subtitle B: Fraudulent Access to Financial 
Information. Pretexting is often referred to as social engineering and may result from 
the phishing technique. As such, pretexting is an attempt to gain confidential 
information in an unauthorised manner. It may be done telephonically, via email or a 
spoofed website. Social engineering and phishing techniques were identified in 
Chapter 3 as threats facing the home users of online banking.  
 
The GLB Act makes an important distinction between customers and consumers.  
According to the GLB Act, a consumer is a person who obtains a product or service 
from a financial institution for personal, family or household purposes while a 
customer is a consumer who has a continuing relationship with a financial institution. 
Under the GLB Act, the bank has different obligations to customers and to consumers. 
For the purposes of this research, the home user of online banking will be classed as a 
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customer. In this section, Subtitle A, sections 6801-6809 and Subtitle B, and sections 
6821-6827 in the GLB Act will be analysed for the ISA obligations which banks have 
towards their online banking customers. 
 
Subtitle A, sections 6801–6809, deals with both the Financial Privacy Rule and the 
Safeguards Rule. The Financial Privacy Rule addresses the collection and disclosure 
of customers’ personal financial information while the Safeguards Rule addresses the 
need for a bank to have in place a documented security plan which communicates 
how the bank concerned intends to protect its customers’ information. Subtitle B, 
sections 6821-6827, deals with Pretexting Protection. The GLB Act requires banks to 
plan and implement controls against pretexting. The awareness requirements imposed 
on banks by the GLB Act, when complying with Subtitle A and Subtitle B, are 
presented in Table 5-3.    
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Table 5-3 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 Requirements 
Reference Requirement 
Subtitle A, Section 6801 
Banks should make online banking customers aware of the bank’s stance on privacy of customers’ non-public, personal 
information. 
Banks should implement an information security plan and standards to protect the security and privacy of customer 
information, to protect the integrity of customer information from threats and to protect customer information from 
unauthorised access. This security plan should include an awareness programme aimed at customers of online banking, 
informing them of the threats relevant to them and countermeasures they may implement to protect themselves. 
Subtitle A, Section 6802 
Banks should make customers aware of the circumstances under which their non-public, personal information will be 
shared, how they will be notified and their opt-out options.  
Subtitle A, Section 6803 
Banks should make customers aware of their privacy policy, dealing with disclosure and protection of customers’ non-
public personal information. This should be done upon initiation of the customer relationship and annually thereafter until 
the relationship is terminated. 
Banks should make customers aware of: 
 The types of organisations their non-public personal information will be shared with 
 The bank’s policy on disclosing current customers’ non-public personal information with past customers 
 The types of customers’ non-public personal information collected by the bank 
 The banks’ policy on how it protects the security and confidentiality of customers’ non-public personal information 
Subtitle B, Section 6821 
Banks should make online banking customers aware of the methods used in pretexting, how to identify pretexting and how 
to respond. For example, make online banking customers aware of the procedure to be followed when reporting a security 
incident such as a social engineering or phishing attempt.  
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5.3.4 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 
 
On 2 August, 2002, The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, Act No. 
25 of 2002 (referred to in this section as “the Act”), was published after having been 
agreed to by the President of the Republic of South Africa on 30 July, 2002.  The Act 
became law on 30 August, 2002. The purpose of this act is to regulate electronic 
transactions, to address the abuse of information systems, and to provide legal 
guidance where no guidance had existed before. The objects of the act which are 
relevant to this research include: 
 
 promoting an appreciation and acceptance of the increasing number of 
electronic transactions in South Africa 
 promoting the regulation of and confidence in electronic communications and 
transactions 
 ensuring that all aspects of electronic transactions in South Africa comply 
with international standards 
 developing and maintaining a safe and secure environment within which 
home and business users, as well as government, may use electronic 
transactions 
 
The Act comprises fourteen chapters. For the purposes of this research, Chapter VII of 
the Act − Consumer Protection, and Chapter VIII − Protection of Personal 
Information, will be analysed. Awareness requirements imposed on banks by the Act 
are presented in Table 5-4.   
 
Table 5-4 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 requirements  
  
  
Reference Requirement 
Chapter VIII, section 51 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that 
their personal information will be collected, stored, processed and 
released only for lawful purposes and that they will be notified 
before any such activities take place 
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5.3.5 Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 
 
The Protection of Personal Information Bill, referred to in this section as “the Bill”, 
was published on 25 August, 2009. This Bill is aligned with section 14 of the 
Constitution of South Africa, stating a person’s right  to privacy. Banks have a social 
and legal responsibility to protect the personal information of consumers. Identity 
theft may result from a criminal’s possession of non-public, personal information. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the major threats facing the home users of online banking 
were all associated with identity theft. The Bill requires that organisations which 
collect and process personal information to do so in a lawful and secure manner.  The 
Bill consists of the following eight information protection principles which will be 
analysed for the ISA obligations which banks have in respect of their home users of 
online banking: 
 accountability 
 processing limitation 
 purpose specification 
 further processing limitation 
 information quality 
 openness 
 security safeguards 
 data subject participation 
Awareness requirements imposed on banks by the Bill are presented in Table 5-5. 
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Table 5-5 Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 requirements 
Reference Requirement 
Principle 1: 
Accountability 
Not applicable to this research 
Principle 2: Processing 
limitation 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that only necessary personal information will be collected and 
processed in a lawful manner, with the consent of the home user 
Principle 3: Purpose 
specification 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that their personal information will only be collected and 
processed for legitimate purposes and retained only for as long as required by these purposes. The purposes for collection 
and processing should be explained to the home user before such collection or processing takes place 
Principle 4: Further 
processing limitation 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will be notified and their consent sought should the 
bank need to process their personal information for purposes not already specified 
Principle 5: Information 
quality 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that their personal information will be kept accurate and up-to-
date 
Principle 6: Openness 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will always be notified of the types of personal 
information collected about them and the purpose for which it is being collected and processed  
Principle 7: Security 
safeguards 
 Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of the efforts made by the banks to keep personal 
information safe from loss, unauthorised access and either unlawful processing or disclosure 
 Banks should also make home users aware of the countermeasures they may implement in order to protect their 
personal information 
 Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will be notified if it has been established that 
their personal information has been compromised 
Principle 8: Data subject 
participation 
Banks should make home users aware that they are entitled to confirm what personal information is held for the purpose of 
online banking as well as update or delete, or request to be updated or deleted, personal information held by the bank for the 
purpose of online banking 
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5.3.6 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 
 
On 3 February 2000, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, Act No. 2 of 2000, 
referred to in this section as “the Act”, was published after having been agreed to by 
the President of the Republic of South Africa on 2 February, 2000. The purpose of 
this act is to regulate access to information held by either a public or a private body. 
The Act addresses the access to information held by a public body separately to the 
access to information held by a private body. A bank is not a department of state and 
is considered to be a private body. The requirements as stipulated in Part 3: Access to 
Records of Private Bodies of the Act are analysed for the ISA obligations which a 
bank has towards its home users of online banking. The Act should be read together 
with the laws repealed and amended in the Schedule of the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill, 2009. The awareness requirements imposed on banks by the Act are 
presented in Table 5-6. 
 
 
Table 5-6 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 requirements  
 
 
 
  
Reference Requirement 
Part 3, Section 63 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that 
banks will not unreasonably disclose the home user’s personal or 
financial information in answer to any requestor other than that of 
the home user  
Part 3, Section 71 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that 
they will be informed should a requestor, other than the home 
user, attempt to access either their personal information or their 
financial information. Banks should also inform home users of 
their rights to refuse access to their personal information by a 
requestor 
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5.3.7 The Code of Banking Practice 
 
The Code of Banking Practice, referred to in this section as “the Code”, was released 
by the Banking Council South Africa and has been in force since 1 October 2004. The 
Code pertains to dealings between banks and their clients as well as providing 
safeguards for the clients of banks. The Code is not legally binding, however, should a 
bank refuse to comply with the Code, the Ombudsman for Banking Services may 
publish this fact. Such a disclosure may affect consumers’ trust in the banking service. 
In this section 5.3.7, a home user of online banking will be referred to as a personal 
client. The Code defines a personal client as a natural person who maintains an 
account or makes use of other services provided by a bank.  
 
Section 3 of the Code outlines the fundamental principles of the bank-client 
relationship. These principles include the provision of both reliable banking and 
payment systems to the personal client, with due care being exercised to ensure that 
these systems remain secure. Section 4: Disclosure of the Code, states that banks will 
recommend safety measures and tips as pertaining to their services, where relevant. In 
addition, the Code explicitly addresses internet and telephone banking in section 5.14 
(Section 5: Conduct). The Code may hold the personal client liable for losses should 
he/she either not take reasonable care or fail to comply with the precautions set out in 
section 5.14. Banks have the option of either making their personal clients who use 
the online banking service aware of these precautions through the medium of an ISA 
programme or else making them aware of the existence of the Code through such a 
programme. The precautions recommended in section 5.14 by the Banking Council 
South Africa to personal clients using the online banking service are presented in 
Table 5-7.    
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Table 5-7 Code of Banking Practice requirements 
Reference Requirement 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should inform personal clients using online banking that they review their bank statements and reconcile their 
accounts on a regular basis  
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking never to reveal their online banking password or any 
unique, personally identifiable information, even to bank staff 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they always check the online banking site’s security 
certificate before carrying out their banking 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they change a temporary password to a strong 
password known to the personal client only as soon as possible 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they change their password immediately when they 
suspect its confidentiality has been compromised 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should make personal clients using online banking aware that the security of their personal computers is the 
responsibility of the personal client  
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they read and understand the terms and conditions 
associated with the online banking service before signing up for the service 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they take care to enter login and transaction 
information accurately 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they take care to enter accurate transaction 
information as it is not possible to reverse transactions without the recipient’s consent 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they disable “remember my password” browser 
functionality 
Section 5: Conduct 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they install effective antivirus and security software 
on their personal computers and that they keep this software up to date 
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5.3.8 Consumer Protection Act, 2008 
 
On 29 April, 2009, the Consumer Protection Act, Act No. 68 of 2008, referred to in 
this section as “the Act”, was published and assented to by the President of the 
Republic of South Africa. The purpose of the Act is to promote fair business practice 
in the supply of goods or services to consumers. The law was enacted, inter alia, to 
protect consumers from risks to their safety and security when receiving goods from 
suppliers or when benefiting from services. The suppliers of goods and service 
providers, such as banks, are required to have demonstrated compliance with the Act 
by 1 April, 2011. The Act refers to the person receiving the goods or benefiting from 
the service as the consumer. In this section 5.3.8 the home users of online banking 
will be referred to as consumers. The objectives of the Act are described in Part B of 
Chapter 1 of the Act. These objectives include the enhancement of consumer 
awareness  and the encouragement of responsible and informed consumer choice and 
behaviour. By making the home users of online banking aware of the risks they face, 
as well as how they may mitigate these risks, the banks are playing an important role 
in protecting their consumers. The awareness requirements imposed on banks in terms 
of the Act are presented in Table 5-8. 
 
 
Table 5-8 Consumer Protection Act, 2008 requirements 
 
 
Reference Requirement 
Chapter 2, Part H, 
Section 58 
Banks should make consumers aware, in simple, unambiguous 
language, of any risk associated with the online banking service 
that a generally alert consumer would not expect  
Chapter 2, Part H, 
Section 60 
Banks should make consumers aware of incident reporting 
facilities and procedures 
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5.3.9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996, referred to in 
this section as “the Constitution”, was promulgated on 18 December, 1996 with the 
intention that it would come into effect on 4 February 1997. The Constitution is the 
highest law in South Africa with any laws which are in conflict with the Constitution 
being deemed invalid. Chapter 2 of the Constitution presents the Bill of Rights. 
Section 14 of the Bill of Rights is relevant to this research as this section states a 
person’s right to privacy. The privacy of an individual’s non-public, personal 
information is addressed in the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009, which is 
aligned with section 14 of the Constitution. The Protection of Personal Information 
Bill was analysed for the awareness requirements it imposes on banks in section 3.3.5 
of this research study. The requirements imposed on banks by the Constitution are 
presented in Table 5-9. 
 
 
Table 5-9 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa requirements 
 
Reference Requirement 
Section 14 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware both 
of the existence of threats to the privacy of their non-public, 
personal information and also of the countermeasures they should 
implement in order to protect the privacy of their non-public, 
personal information 
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5.3.10 Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (King III), 25 February, 
2009 
 
The Code of Governance Principles for South Africa, referred to in this section as 
“King III”, comprises a set of corporate governance principles. King III was preceded 
by King I and King II. Trends and changes in international corporate governance were 
taken into account when King III was compiled. King III applies to all organisations 
and an organisation’s compliance with this code will result in the practise of good 
governance. However, should a practice recommended by the code not be 
implemented by an organisation, this will be deemed acceptable if the board of the 
organisation is able to explain that the practice which is being implemented instead is 
a better fit for the organisation and results in compliance. Unlike King I and King II, 
King III addresses IT governance in detail. King III recognises the significance of the 
impact which IT risks may have on an organisation and it recommends the 
implementation of international standards, such as the standards addressed in Chapter 
4 of this research, to manage and mitigate IT risks effectively. Chapter 4 of King III 
deals with risk management. Principle 4.16 covers IT security. This principle is 
analysed for the awareness requirements imposed on banks when implementing an 
ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. These requirements are 
presented in Table 5-10. 
 
 
Table 5-10 Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (King III), 2009 requirements 
Reference Requirement 
Principle 4.16 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that 
the banks adopt an uncompromising position regarding the 
security of online banking transactions 
Principle 4.16 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of 
the threats they face when conducting online banking and also 
recommend countermeasures which home users should 
implement to mitigate the associated risks 
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5.3.11 Electronic Communications Act, 2005 
 
On 18 April 2006, the Electronic Communications Act, Act No. 36 of 2005, referred 
to in this section as “the Act”, was published and assented to by the President of the 
Republic of South Africa. The purpose of the Act is to provide a legal framework 
governing the convergence of broadcasting, broadcasting signal distribution and 
telecommunications sectors. The Act includes social obligations. Section 3(1) of the 
Act calls for the development of policies that are aligned with and support the 
objectives of the Act.  
 
Accordingly, on 19 February 2010, a government notice was released by the 
Department of Communications making public the intention to create the South 
African National Cybersecurity Policy and to present the Draft Cybersecurity Policy 
of South Africa. This policy takes into account other legislation in South Africa which 
impacts on cybersecurity. The objectives of this policy include the encouragement of 
a joint effort between government and the private sector to create and promote a 
culture of cybersecurity. The policy anticipates that one of the benefits derived from a 
secure cyberspace would include a safe and secure cyberspace that the individual 
would be able both to trust and to use with confidence. Although the policy does not 
offer guidance on the content of an ISA programme, it does require that such a 
programme be implemented. The obligations imposed on banks by the policy, in 
accordance with the Act, when addressing information security awareness amongst 
the home users of online banking are presented in Table 5-11.  
 
Table 5-11 Electronic Communications Act, 2005 requirements 
 
 
  
Reference Requirements 
Chapter 6 Banks should promote a culture of cybersecurity by developing 
and implementing ISA programmes aimed at the home users of 
online banking 
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5.4 The Legislation Requirements List 
 
A list of requirements imposed on banks by the selected laws, regulations, statutes and 
contractual obligations which were investigated in this research are presented in  
Table 5-12 with the requirements pertaining to these laws, regulations, statutes and 
contractual obligations being sectioned under the relevant legislation. The final list of 
legal requirements includes the following 18 requirements: 
 
1. Banks should identify home users of online banking as a target audience 
for user awareness programmes and ensure awareness materials reach all 
home users of online banking. 
2. Banks should make consumers aware, in plain language, of any risk 
associated with the online banking service that an ordinarily alert 
consumer would not expect. 
3. Banks should promote a culture of cybersecurity by developing and 
implementing an ISA programme aimed at home users of online banking. 
4. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they take a 
stern stance on the security of online banking transactions and privacy of 
personal information. 
5. The bank should make timely and frequent public disclosures of 
information which will assist the public to determine how effective a bank 
is at risk identification, assessment, monitoring and control.  This should 
include the use of an independent auditor. 
6. Banks should make home users of online banking aware of the threats they 
face when banking online, including threats to the privacy of their personal 
information, and recommend countermeasures they should implement to 
mitigate the associated risks. 
7. Banks should make antivirus software available to home users of online 
banking. 
8. Banks should make home users aware of incident reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
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9. Banks should review the content of ISA programmes to include new 
threats, changes in incident reporting procedures and response times and 
make home users aware of these new threats. 
10. Banks should make home users of online banking aware of their privacy 
policy, dealing with disclosure and protection of customers’ non-public 
personal information.  This should be done upon initiation of the customer 
relationship and annually thereafter until the relationship is terminated. 
11. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that their personal 
information will only be collected and processed for legitimate purposes 
and retained only for as long as required by these purposes.  The purposes 
for collection and processing should be explained to the home user before 
collection or processing takes place. 
12. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they will be 
notified if it can be established that their personal information has been 
compromised. 
13. Banks should make home users aware that they are entitled to confirm 
what personal information is held for the purpose of online banking as well 
as update or delete, or request to be updated or deleted, personal 
information held by the bank for the purpose of online banking. 
14. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they will be 
informed should a requestor other than the home user attempt to access 
their personal information or financial information.  The bank should also 
inform the home user of their rights to refuse access to their personal 
information by the requestor. 
15. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that 
they review their bank statements and reconcile their accounts on a regular 
basis. 
16. Banks should make personal clients using online banking aware that 
security of their personal computer is the responsibility of the personal 
client. 
17. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that 
they read and understand the terms and conditions associated with the 
online banking service before signing up for the service. 
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18. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that 
they be careful to enter accurate transaction information as transactions 
cannot be reversed without the recipient’s consent
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Table 5-12 Legal requirements 
Legislation Requirement 
BASEL II 
 
 
Banks should make home users aware of their approach to identifying and mitigating risks facing them 
when participating in online banking.  
 
Banks should review risks facing home users of online banking and make appropriate changes to its risk 
mitigating processes, including the content of the ISA programme.   
Banks should assure home users of online banking that the effectiveness of controls implemented to 
mitigate risks facing them are reviewed by an independent auditor. 
Banks should identify all risks facing home users of online banking and make home users aware of how 
they can mitigate these risks.  
Banks should implement controls to mitigate new threats to home users of online banking and, where 
appropriate, update the ISA programme to include these new threats. 
 The board of directors and senior management at banks should demonstrate to the public a stern 
stance on information security 
 Banks should make home users of online banking aware of information security technology they 
can implement to mitigate risks, and, where possible, make this technology available to home 
users.  An example of such a technology would be software which checks the home user’s 
antivirus software and notifies the home user if it offers sufficient protection when banking online 
The bank should make timely and frequent public disclosures of information which will assist the public 
to determine how effective a bank is at risk identification, assessment, monitoring and control. 
General qualitative disclosure requirement 
Banks must describe their risk management objectives and policies. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (COBIT 4.1) Banks should identify what home users of online banking need to be made aware of through the ISA 
programme, such as threats and countermeasure 
Banks should identify home users of online banking as a target audience for user awareness programmes 
and ensure awareness materials reach all home users of online banking 
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Legislation Requirement 
Banks should conduct surveys on security awareness amongst home users of online banking after the 
implementation of an ISA programme.  This should serve as an input for improving the next ISA 
programme 
Banks should make home users aware of incident reporting procedures and expected response times 
Banks should conduct a survey amongst home users on how satisfied they are with the response to 
reported online banking incidents.  The results should be used to improve the incident response procedure.  
Home users of online banking should be made aware of new incident reporting procedures and incident 
response times 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 Banks should make online banking customers aware of the bank’s stance on privacy of customers’ non-
public, personal information. 
Banks should implement an information security plan and standards to protect the security and privacy of 
customer information, to protect the integrity of customer information from threats and to protect 
customer information from unauthorised access. This security plan should include an awareness 
programme aimed at customers of online banking, informing them of the threats relevant to them and 
countermeasures they may implement to protect themselves. 
Banks should make customers aware of the circumstances under which their non-public, personal 
information will be shared, how they will be notified and their opt-out options.  
Banks should make customers aware of their privacy policy, dealing with disclosure and protection of 
customers’ non-public personal information. This should be done upon initiation of the customer 
relationship and annually thereafter until the relationship is terminated. 
Banks should make customers aware of: 
 The types of organisations their non-public personal information will be shared with 
 The bank’s policy on disclosing current customers’ non-public personal information with past 
customers 
 The types of customers’ non-public personal information collected by the bank 
 The banks’ policy on how it protects the security and confidentiality of customers’ non-public 
personal information 
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Legislation Requirement 
Banks should make online banking customers aware of the methods used in pretexting, how to identify 
pretexting and how to respond. For example, make online banking customers aware of the procedure to be 
followed when reporting a security incident such as a social engineering or phishing attempt.  
Protection of Personal Information Bill  
Promotion of Access to Information Act, 
2000 
Not applicable to this research 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that only necessary personal information will 
be collected and processed in a lawful manner, with the consent of the home user 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that their personal information will only be 
collected and processed for legitimate purposes and retained only for as long as required by these 
purposes. The purposes for collection and processing should be explained to the home user before such 
collection or processing takes place 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will be notified and their consent 
sought should the bank need to process their personal information for purposes not already specified 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that their personal information will be kept 
accurate and up-to-date 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will always be notified of the types 
of personal information collected about them and the purpose for which it is being collected and 
processed  
 Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of the efforts made by the banks to 
keep personal information safe from loss, unauthorised access and either unlawful processing or 
disclosure 
 Banks should also make home users aware of the countermeasures they may implement in order to 
protect their personal information 
 Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will be notified if it has been 
established that their personal information has been compromised 
Banks should make home users aware that they are entitled to confirm what personal information is held 
for the purpose of online banking as well as update or delete, or request to be updated or deleted, personal 
information held by the bank for the purpose of online banking 
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Legislation Requirement 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that banks will not unreasonably disclose the 
home user’s personal or financial information in answer to any requestor other than that of the home user  
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will be informed should a requestor, 
other than the home user, attempt to access either their personal information or their financial information. 
Banks should also inform home users of their rights to refuse access to their personal information by a 
requestor 
The Code of Banking Practice Banks should inform personal clients using online banking that they review their bank statements and 
reconcile their accounts on a regular basis  
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking never to reveal their online banking 
password or any unique, personally identifiable information, even to bank staff 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they always check the online 
banking site’s security certificate before carrying out their banking 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they change a temporary password 
to a strong password known to the personal client only as soon as possible 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they change their password 
immediately when they suspect its confidentiality has been compromised 
Banks should make personal clients using online banking aware that the security of their personal 
computers is the responsibility of the personal client  
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they read and understand the terms 
and conditions associated with the online banking service before signing up for the service 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they take care to enter login and 
transaction information accurately 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they take care to enter accurate 
transaction information as it is not possible to reverse transactions without the recipient’s consent 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they disable “remember my 
password” browser functionality 
Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they install effective antivirus and 
security software on their personal computers and that they keep this software up to date 
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Legislation Requirement 
Consumer Protection Act, 2008 Banks should make consumers aware, in simple, unambiguous language, of any risk associated with the 
online banking service that a generally alert consumer would not expect  
Banks should make consumers aware of incident reporting facilities and procedures 
Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 
 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware both of the existence of threats to the privacy 
of their non-public, personal information and also of the countermeasures they should implement in order 
to protect the privacy of their non-public, personal information 
Code of Governance Principles for South 
Africa (King III), 25 February, 2009 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that the banks adopt an uncompromising 
position regarding the security of online banking transactions 
Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of the threats they face when conducting 
online banking and also recommend countermeasures which home users should implement to mitigate the 
associated risks 
Electronic Communications Act, 2005 Banks should promote a culture of cybersecurity by developing and implementing ISA programmes 
aimed at the home users of online banking 
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5.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, a list of laws, regulations, statutes and contractual obligations was 
selected and analysed for the legal requirements imposed on South African banks 
regarding ISA programmes aimed at the home users of online banking. Despite the 
fact that this list is not exhaustive it is deemed sufficient for the purposes of this 
research. Both international and South African legal documents were analysed. South 
African banks would need to evaluate their business activities in order to determine 
which legal requirements pertain to them. Each legal document selected was 
examined so as to gain an understanding of what an ISA programme would need to 
include to satisfy the legal requirements. The final outcome of the process is a list of 
legal requirements to be taken into account when devising such a programme.  
 
In Chapter 6 this list is compared to the final list of best practice recommendations 
identified in Chapter 4 in order to identify any gaps which exist between best practice 
recommendations and legal requirements in terms of an ISA programme aimed at the 
home users of online banking. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
There is a close link between best practice and legislation. Information security best 
practices address laws and regulations and recommend controls to be implemented to 
enable organisations to comply with information security legislation. Chapter 4 
identified best practice recommendations for information security awareness (ISA) 
while Chapter 5 identified the ISA requirements imposed on banks by legislation. 
This chapter compares the best practice recommendations selected and legal 
requirements selected to determine whether compliance with best practices would 
result in compliance with legislation.  
 
6.2 Comparison of Legal Requirements and Best Practice 
Recommendations 
 
The main objective of this research study is a comparison between best practice 
recommendations and the legal requirements for information security awareness. The 
gap identified between best practice recommendations and the legal requirements is 
the main outcome of this research study and comprises the contribution made by this 
study to the area of research. In Chapter 4, selected best practices, which are 
internationally recognised and implementable in banks, were analysed for 
recommendations when implementing an ISA programme aimed at the home users of 
online banking. A similar analysis was conducted in Chapter 5 but with the focus on 
selected legislation pertinent to South African banks and with information security 
implications. The best practice recommendations identified include the following: 
 
A. Banks should identify what the home users of online banking need to be made 
aware of through the medium of ISA programmes, for example, threats and 
countermeasures. 
B. Banks should identify the home users of online banking as a target audience 
for user awareness programmes and ensure that awareness materials reach all 
the home users of online banking. 
C. Banks should conduct surveys on the level of security awareness amongst the 
home users of online banking after the implementation of an ISA programme. 
These results should serve as an input for improving the next ISA programme. 
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D. Banks should make home users aware of incident-reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
E. Banks should conduct a survey amongst home users on their level of 
satisfaction with the response to online banking incidents reported. These 
results should be used to improve the incident response procedure.  Home users 
of online banking should then be made aware of new incident reporting 
procedures and incident response times. 
F. Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of ways in which 
they may protect their information. 
G. Banks should make home users aware of, and require them to comply with, 
certain security requirements as stipulated in the information security policy 
before signing up for online banking. 
H. Banks should demonstrate to the home users of online banking that the banks 
adopt an uncompromising position in respect of information security 
management and awareness. 
 
The legal requirements identified include the following: 
 
1. Banks should identify home users of online banking as a target audience for 
user awareness programmes and ensure awareness materials reach all home 
users of online banking. 
2. Banks should make consumers aware, in plain language, of any risk associated 
with the online banking service that an ordinarily alert consumer would not 
expect. 
3. Banks should promote a culture of cybersecurity by developing and 
implementing an ISA programme aimed at home users of online banking. 
4. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they take a stern 
stance on the security of online banking transactions and privacy of personal 
information. 
5. The bank should make timely and frequent public disclosures of information 
which will assist the public to determine how effective a bank is at risk 
identification, assessment, monitoring and control.  This should include the 
use of an independent auditor. 
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6. Banks should make home users of online banking aware of the threats they 
face when online banking, including threats to the privacy of their personal 
information, and recommend countermeasures they should implement to 
mitigate the associated risks. 
7. Banks should make antivirus software available to home users of online 
banking. 
8. Banks should make home users aware of incident reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
9. Banks should review the content of ISA programmes to include new threats, 
changes in incident reporting procedures and response times and make home 
users aware of these new threats. 
10. Banks should make home users of online banking aware of their privacy 
policy, dealing with disclosure and protection of customers’ non -public 
personal information.  This should be done upon initiation of the customer 
relationship and annually thereafter until the relationship is terminated. 
11. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that their personal 
information will only be collected and processed for legitimate purposes and 
retained only for as long as required by these purposes.  The purposes for 
collection and processing should be explained to the home user before 
collection or processing takes place. 
12. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they will be 
notified if it can be established that their personal information has been 
compromised. 
13. Banks should make home users aware that they are entitled to confirm what 
personal information is held for the purpose of online banking as well as 
update or delete, or request to be updated or deleted, personal information held 
by the bank for the purpose of online banking. 
14. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they will be 
informed should a requestor other than the home user attempt to access their 
personal information or financial information.  The bank should also inform 
the home user of their rights to refuse access to their personal information by 
the requestor. 
15. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they 
review their bank statements and reconcile their accounts on a regular basis.  
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16. Banks should make personal clients using online banking aware that security 
of their personal computer is the responsibility of the personal client. 
17. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they 
read and understand the terms and conditions associated with the online 
banking service before signing up for the service. 
18. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they be 
careful to enter accurate transaction information as transactions cannot be 
reversed without the recipient’s consent. 
 
Figure 6-1 illustrates the gap between the legal requirements selected and the best 
practice recommendations selected by showing which best practice recommendations 
support which legal requirement. 
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Figure 6-1 Comparison of legal requirements and best practice recommendations  
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6.3 Findings 
 
Finding 1: The results show that the implementation of the selected best practice 
recommendations would fully satisfy seven of the 18 legal 
requirements only and partially satisfy the other nine. There are no 
other recommendations offered for two of the 18 legal requirements.  
Finding 2: Compliance with legal requirements 1 to 4, 6, 8 and 17 may be 
achieved through the implementation of best practice 
recommendations. 
Finding 3: Legal requirement number 5 is partially satisfied by the selected best 
practices.  Selected best practices require a bank to demonstrate a stern 
stance on risk management, but do not explicitly require a bank to 
disclose incidents which would be material to the home users’ 
decisions to continue making use of the online banking service. 
Finding 4: Legal requirements number 7 is partially satisfied by the 
implementation of best practice recommendations.  The selected best 
practice recommendations do not explicitly require banks to make 
security software available to home users of online banking, as 
required by legal requirement number 7.  However, the selected best 
practices recommend that banks make home users of online banking 
aware of countermeasures they can implement and recommend 
awareness materials reach all home users.  Security software may be 
included in the awareness materials;   
Finding 5: Legal requirement number 9 is only partially satisfied by the 
implementation of selected best practice recommendations.  The 
recommendations do not state the need to update the content of the ISA 
programme to include new threats.  However, the Standard of Good 
Practice for Information Security statement UE6.2.6 recommends that 
banks should review security incidents and use findings to update the 
next ISA programme aimed at home users of online banking.  Such a 
review would reveal previously unidentified threats to home users of 
online banking. 
Finding 6: Although the selected best practices recommend that banks make home 
users aware of how they can protect their personal information, legal 
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requirements 10 to 15 suggest that best practices do not offer sufficient 
guidance on ensuring privacy of personal information.  However, the 
Standard of Good Practice for Information Security section UE6.1 does 
address information privacy, recommending that banks develop and 
implement approved methods for handling personally identifiable 
information.  
Finding 7: No matches for legal requirements numbers 16 and 18 suggest that the 
selected best practices do not stipulate the need for home users to be 
made aware of what their responsibilities are when protecting 
themselves. 
 
It may, thus, be concluded that implementing the ISA recommendations identified in 
the selected best practices does not result in compliance with the ISA requirements 
identified in the selected legislation. 
6.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the recommendations identified in the selected best practices in 
Chapter 4 were compared to the requirements identified in the selected legislation in 
Chapter 5. A gap was identified, which demonstrated that the implementation of the 
selected best practices does not result in compliance with the requirements identified 
in the selected legislation. It is essential that banks first be aware of the legislation 
with which they have to comply and then select controls from reputable best practices 
and international standards to ensure compliance. However, the best practices and 
international standards consulted should not be limited to those analysed in this 
research. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
A large number of South African home users are becoming aware of and are, in turn, 
able to use online banking. Consequently, these home users of online banking are 
facing multiple information security threats while conducting their online banking. 
From a security perspective, it is essential that the human element of the security 
chain be addressed. Accordingly, the focus of this research has been on home users 
and the actions which South African banks are both required and advised to take when 
implementing Information Security Awareness (ISA) programmes aimed at the home 
users of online banking. 
  
It is vital that South African banks protect their home users from the information 
security threats they face as online bankers, that they be able to demonstrate due care 
and due diligence when addressing these information security threats by 
implementing best practice, and that they recognise and comply with the legal 
requirements imposed on them.  
 
In this chapter, both the problem statement and the research questions are revisited to 
confirm the research findings. Related problem areas which have emerged from the 
research are discussed as well as the way in which these problem areas may be 
addressed by future work.   
7.2 Scope of Research 
 
This research investigated the following three main areas: 
 
 Information security threats facing home users of online banking, creating the 
need for security initiatives and industry regulation 
 Recommendations from selected best practices for the implementation of an 
ISA programme aimed at home users of online banking 
 Requirements from selected legislation placed on South African banks for 
information security awareness of home users of online banking   
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The results from a gap analysis compared the recommendations identified from 
selected information security best practice with the requirements identified from 
selected information security legislation. The gap identified, the limitations of this 
research and the nature of information security threats form the basis for further 
research on the subject. 
7.3 Problem Areas identified through the Research 
 
Certain problem areas related to the problem statement emerged from the research. It 
is essential that these problem areas be attended to in future research into the field of 
information security in online banking.  
7.3.1 The Gap 
 
It was discovered that the implementation of the selected best practice 
recommendations does not result in compliance with all the selected ISA legal 
requirements.       
7.3.2 Limited Number of Best Practice Standards Included 
 
This research included three international best practice documents and not an 
exhaustive list of best practice documents.  Best practice documents not included in 
this research could offer guidance in respect of the outstanding legal requirements not 
satisfied by selected best practice recommendations. 
7.3.3 Legislation is Open to Interpretation 
 
Legislation is written in a high-level fashion, can be ambiguous and is therefore open 
to interpretation.  For this reason, other researchers may gather findings which differ 
from those gathered in this research. 
7.3.4 The Provision for Evolving Threats in Legislation 
 
Hackers are constantly evolving their attack methods.  Laws and regulations may not 
advance fast enough to effectively address new information security threats.  
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7.3.5 Validation of Research Findings 
 
This research investigated the requirements imposed on South African banks, but did 
not investigate the relevance of the findings to South African banks. The research 
does not determine if a gap exists between ISA best practice implemented by a South 
African bank and the legislation they are required to comply with.  
7.4 Research Questions 
 
This section re-visits the research questions as depicted in Chapter 1. 
 
7.4.1 Information Security Best Practice 
 
The first research question set out to determine information security best practice 
recommendations for information security awareness of home users of online 
banking. Information security best practice documents were selected based on the 
criteria that they are internationally recognised, implementable in a banking 
environment and are available to the public. The best practices identified included 
COBIT version 4.1, ISO/IEC 27001 and The Standard of Good Practice for 
Information Security. Each selected document was analysed for the guidance it offers 
for the implementation of an ISA programme. The result was a final list of eight best 
practice recommendations for information security awareness. 
 
7.4.2 Information Security Legislation 
 
The second research question set out to determine the information security legal 
requirements imposed on South African banks regarding information security 
awareness of their home users of online banking.  An information security attorney 
and privacy professional from Deloitte and Touche was consulted for their opinion on 
which legal documents to include.  They recommended international banking 
legislation and South African legislation and also suggested other relevant documents. 
In addition, a visit to the South African government’s website for publicly available 
documents was also carried out to research other pertinent documents and to identify 
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relevant amendments to the final list of documents. Each selected legal document was 
analysed for the requirements imposed on South African banks when implementing an 
ISA programme aimed at the home users of online banking. The result was a list of 18 
legal requirements for information security awareness.   
 
7.4.3 Identifying the Gap 
 
The third research question set out to identify any gap between ISA best practice 
recommendations and existing ISA legal requirements. The best practice 
recommendations identified from selected best practice documents in Chapter 4 were 
compared to the legal requirements identified in selected legislation in Chapter 5 and 
a gap was, indeed, noted.  
 
7.4.4 The Problem Statement 
 
The following problem statement forms the core of this research as depicted in 
Chapter 1: 
 
If South African banks implement information security awareness best practices, do 
they automatically comply with information security awareness laws and regulations?  
 
The findings of this research indicate that the implementation of the selected best 
practices included in this research does not result in compliance with the legal 
requirements identified in the legislation selected for this research.  
7.5 Future Work 
 
The comparison between the identified recommendations from selected best practices 
and the identified requirements from selected legislation determined that there is, 
indeed, a gap between the recommendations and the requirements. Further research 
could determine the reason why this gap exists. The list of best practices analysed in 
this research was not exhaustive and, thus, further research could be carried out to 
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determine whether other best practice documents include recommendations which 
may satisfy the gaps identified. In view of the fact that the legal documents included 
in this research are written in a high-level  fashion and may be ambiguous they may, 
thus, be open to interpretation. Accordingly, further research into legal requirements 
is recommended to uncover new findings and to offer new insights into what these 
documents aim to achieve and how organisations may comply with these 
requirements. Further research may also be conducted to determine whether the 
legislation is advancing in such a way so that guidance is offered on the ever-evolving 
attack methods used by hackers. Finally, although this research did extract the 
requirements imposed on South African banks, it did not investigate the relevance of 
the findings to South African banks. A case study carried out at a South African bank 
may determine whether the bank is aware of all the ISA legal requirements imposed 
on banks and what best practice controls the bank has in place to satisfy these 
requirements. 
7.6 Summary 
A large number of South African home users are becoming aware of and are, thus, 
able to use online banking. Consequently, these home users of online banking are  
facing multiple information security threats while conducting their online banking. 
From a security perspective, it is essential that the human element of the security 
chain be addressed. Accordingly, the focus of this research has been on home users 
and the actions South African banks are both required and advised to take when 
implementing ISA programmes aimed at the home users of online banking. 
 
In this chapter, the problem statement and research questions were revisited to 
confirm the validity of the method used and the research findings. Related problem 
areas which emerged from the research were discussed as well as the way in which 
these problem areas may be addressed by future work. 
 
The problem areas which emerged from this research focused on the following: 
 
 the existence of a gap between selected best practice recommendations and 
selected legal requirements 
 the inclusion of a larger number of best practice documents researched 
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 the ambiguity of legislation and the possibility of different interpretations and 
findings on the part of different researchers 
 whether legislation is advancing in such a way that it is addressing the ever- 
evolving information security threats 
 
These problem areas may form the foundation for future work in the area of online 
banking security.  
 
The primary outcome of this research was a comparison between identified best 
practice recommendations and identified legal requirements to determine whether a 
gap existed between them. The findings of the research indicate that the 
implementation of the selected best practices included in this research does not result 
in compliance with the legal requirements identified in the legislation selected for this 
research. 
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Abstract— South African home users of the Internet use the Internet to perform various 
everyday functions. These functions include, but are not limited to, online shopping, 
online gaming, social networking and online banking. Home users of online banking 
face multiple threats, such as phishing and social engineering. These threats come 
from hackers attempting to obtain confidential information, such as online banking 
authentication credentials, from home users. It is, thus, essential that home users of 
online banking be made aware of these threats, how to identify them and what 
countermeasures to implement to protect themselves from hackers. In this respect, 
information security awareness (ISA) programmes are an effective way of making the 
home users of online banking aware of both the threats they face and the 
countermeasures available to protect themselves from these threats.  
 
There are certain legal requirements with which South African banks have to comply 
when implementing ISA initiatives. Non-compliance or failure to demonstrate due 
care and due diligence should a security incident occur will result in financial 
penalties for the bank as well as possible brand damage and loss of customers. Banks 
implement international best practice recommendations in an effort to comply with 
legislation. These include recommendations for information security awareness.  
 
This research investigated both information security best practice recommendations 
and information security legal requirements for information security awareness. A 
selected list of information security best practices was investigated for best practice 
recommendations while a selected list of information security legislation was also 
investigated for legal requirements imposed on South African banks. A gap analysis 
was performed on both these recommendations and requirements to determine 
whether the implementation of best practice recommendations results in compliance 
with legal requirements. The gap analysis found that the implementation of best 
practice recommendations does not result in compliance with legal requirements. 
Accordingly, the outcome of this research highlighted the importance of 
understanding the legal requirements and ensuring that adequate controls are in place 
with which to achieve compliance. 
 
Keywords: information security awareness, online banking, home users, legislation, 
best practice, South Africa 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
South Africans use the Internet for business purposes and at home.  Home users, who 
have access to the Internet, use the Internet to perform various functions on a daily 
basis. These functions include online shopping, online gaming, social networking and 
online banking. Online banking is a system which allows home users to conduct their 
banking over the Internet (Investorwords, 2011).  Online banking is a convenient way 
in which to carry out banking tasks, such as managing bank accounts, checking an 
account transaction history, transferring money and paying accounts. Online banking 
eliminates the need to travel to a bank each time the customer has to complete a 
transaction, giving individuals the option to bank in the comfort of their own homes.    
 
It has become evident in the South African media as major banks launch advertising 
campaigns displaying the benefits of this service and encouraging home users to 
make use of this convenient form of banking.  The number of internet users in South 
Africa has increased from 2.4 million users in 2000 to 5.3 million users in 2009 
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(South Africa Internet Usage and Marketing Report, 2009).  Therefore, a large 
number of South African home users are becoming aware of and are able to use 
online banking.  From a security perspective, the human element of the security chain 
must be addressed (Albrechtsen, 2007; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010; Siponen, 2001).   
 
While convenient, home users face multiple threats when online banking, such as 
phishing and social engineering. These threats emanate from hackers attempting to 
obtain confidential information from home users, for example, online banking 
authentication credentials. It is, thus, essential that the home users of online banking 
be made aware of these threats, how to identify them and the countermeasures 
available to protect themselves from the hackers’ attempts.   
 
An information security awareness (ISA) programme is an effective means of doing 
this.  Information security awareness (ISA) comprises one component of an 
information security programme and it is associated with the education of the end 
users of an information technology system on relevant information security threats 
and countermeasures (Wilson & Nash, 2003). This research addresses the 
responsibilities incumbent on South African banks for the information security 
awareness of South African home users of online banking.   
 
This research will investigate both information security best practice 
recommendations and information security legal requirements for information 
security awareness. A selected list of information security best practices will be 
investigated for best practice recommendations while a selected list of information 
security legislation will also be investigated for legal requirements imposed on South 
African banks. A gap analysis will be performed on both these recommendations and 
requirements to determine whether implementation of ISA best practice 
recommendations results in compliance with ISA legal requirements. 
 
II. CURRENT AND PREVALENT THREATS TO ONLINE BANKERS 
Online banking has multiple information security threats associated with its use.  This 
research investigates the latest and most prevalent information security threats facing 
the home users of online banking.  These threats create the need for legislation to 
regulate information security in the banking industry and motivate for the 
implementation of information security initiatives like an ISA programme.  The 
objective of the analysis is to create a “Top 10” list of threats facing home users of 
online banking.  These threats are matched with countermeasures that the home user 
may implement.   Selected electronic sources are analysed for information on 
information security threats.  Accordingly, the sources used to identify these threats 
should have the following attributes: 
 
 an information security focus 
 published content, written in the last two years, on current security topics 
 include, in their reporting, security threats which would target the home 
users of online banking 
 
The electronic sources selected are: 
 
 SANS (www.sans.org); 
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 National Cyber Security Alliance (www.staysafeonline.org); 
 CSOOnline (www.csoonline.com); 
 CIO (www.cio.com); 
 Bankinfosecurity (www.bankinfosecurity.com); and, 
 Elsevier academic papers (accessed online via UNISA Library).  
 
Although this is not an exhaustive list, for the scope of this research these sources 
may be considered sufficient.  Each of these electronic sources have been analysed for 
information security threats facing the home users of online banking.  The results 
have been narrowed down, based on frequency, to a top 10 list of information security 
threats facing home users of online banking.  These threats are: 
 
 phishing 
 spoofed websites 
 keystroke logging 
 malware 
 social Engineering 
 minimal protection to data 
 password guessing or theft 
 sensitive information in the user’s recycle bin 
 shared computer threats 
 out of date patches and software 
 
The most prevalent information security threats facing the home users of online 
banking extracted from the identified electronic sources are those aiding identity theft. 
 
III. INFORMATION SECURITY AWARENESS BEST PRACTICE 
In industry, organisations attempt to gain a competitive edge by providing a better 
service or product.  Methods and procedures used to provide services or produce 
products are reviewed and improved over time to try to achieve an optimal way of 
doing things.  The methods and procedures considered at the time to produce the most 
desirable outcome become known as industry best practice.  A best practice is a 
procedure or method which is known to achieve the best possible results 
(BusinessDictionary, 2011; Methods & tools QA Resources, 2009; Wikipedia, 2010).  
In this section, focus is placed on information security best practices and international 
standards.  Information security best practices and international standards are 
important for effective information security governance (von Solms and von Solms, 
2004).  Banking organisations implement best practices for a number of reasons.  
These include improving customer confidence in the banks’ security programmes and 
ensuring their information security programmes are at a standard where, should a 
security breach occur, they are able to demonstrate due care and due diligence and 
avoid financial and legal consequences (von Solms and von Solms, 2004; Williams, 
2008). 
 
This research investigates what recommendations internationally recognised 
information security best practices offer organisations regarding user awareness.  The 
criteria for the selection of the best practices to be included in this research include the 
following: 
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 it must be an internationally accepted information or information security 
standard which can be implemented in a banking organisation 
 it must be available to the public 
 
Based on these criteria, ISO/IEC 27001, COBIT (Version 4.1) and the Standard of 
Good Practice for Information Security (2007) have been selected and are analysed 
for information security awareness recommendations.  This is not an exhaustive list, 
but for the scope of this study, these sources are sufficient.  The objective of the 
analysis is to create a list of recommendations organisations must implement when 
striving to comply with international information security best practices.  The 
recommendations extracted from the selected information security best practices are: 
 
A. Banks should identify what the home users of online banking need to be made 
aware of through the medium of ISA programmes, for example, threats and 
countermeasures. 
B. Banks should identify the home users of online banking as a target audience 
for user awareness programmes and ensure that awareness materials reach all 
the home users of online banking. 
C. Banks should conduct surveys on the level of security awareness amongst the 
home users of online banking after the implementation of an ISA programme. 
These results should serve as an input for improving the next ISA programme. 
D. Banks should make home users aware of incident-reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
E. Banks should conduct a survey amongst home users on their level of 
satisfaction with the response to online banking incidents reported. These 
results should be used to improve the incident response procedure. Home users 
of online banking should then be made aware of new incident reporting 
procedures and incident response times. 
F. Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of ways in which 
they may protect their information. 
G. Banks should make home users aware of, and require them to comply with, 
certain security requirements as stipulated in the information security policy 
before signing up for online banking. 
H. Banks should demonstrate to the home users of online banking that the banks 
adopt an uncompromising position in respect of information security 
management and awareness. 
 
In summary, banks should identify what home users should be made aware of through 
an ISA programme, provide a facility for home users to report incidents and review 
incidents and feedback from home users to determine how ISA programmes can be 
improved. 
 
 IV. INFORMATION SECURITY AWARENESS LEGISLATION 
Online banking is convenient, but has many information security threats associated 
with its use.  The presence of these information security threats and their 
consequences motivates for regulation in the industry, increasingly making 
information security the subject of national and global legislation (Gerber & von 
Solms, 2008).  This research investigates what requirements selected legislation 
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imposes on South African banks for information security awareness amongst the 
home users of online banking.   
 
Legislation was selected based on an interview with Mra Khwar Nyo.  Mra is an 
attorney and Certified Information Privacy Professional (International Association of 
Privacy Professionals) working in the Security and Privacy Services team at Deloitte 
& Touche, South Africa.  Mra was consulted for her opinion on which legislation 
should be included in this study.  She advised on international banking legislation, 
South African legislation and suggested other relevant documents.  A visit to the 
South African government’s website for publicly available documents was carried out 
to research other pertinent documents and identify relevant amendments to the final 
list of documents.  The identified legislation is: 
 
 Basel II; 
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; 
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999; 
 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002 ; 
 Protection of Personal Information Bill; 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; 
 The Code of Banking Practice; 
 Consumer Protection Act, 2008; and, 
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; 
 Code of Governance Principles for South Africa (King III), 25 February, 2009; 
and, 
 Electronic Communications Act, 2005. 
 
This is not an exhaustive list, but for the scope of this study, these sources are 
sufficient.  The objective of the analysis is to create a list of legislative requirements 
South African banks must satisfy when implementing an ISA programme aimed at the 
home users of online banking.  The legal requirements extracted from the selected 
legislation are: 
 
1. Banks should identify the home users of online banking as a target audience 
for user awareness programmes and ensure awareness materials reach all the 
home users of online banking. 
2. Banks should make consumers aware, in plain language, of any risk associated 
with the online banking service that an ordinarily alert consumer would not 
expect. 
3. Banks should promote a culture of cybersecurity by developing and 
implementing an ISA programme aimed at home users of online banking. 
4. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they take a stern 
stance on the security of online banking transactions and privacy of personal 
information. 
5. The bank should make timely and frequent public disclosures of information 
which will assist the public to determine how effective a bank is at risk 
identification, assessment, monitoring and control.  This should include the 
use of an independent auditor. 
6. Banks should make home users of online banking aware of the threats they 
face when online banking, including threats to the privacy of their personal  
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information, and recommend countermeasures they should implement to 
mitigate the associated risks. 
7. Banks should make antivirus software available to home users of online 
banking. 
8. Banks should make home users aware of incident reporting procedures and 
expected response times. 
9. Banks should review the content of ISA programmes to include new threats, 
changes in incident reporting procedures and response times and make home 
users aware of these new threats. 
10. Banks should make the home users of online banking aware of their privacy 
policy, dealing with disclosure and protection of customers’ non -public 
personal information.  This should be done upon initiation of the customer 
relationship and annually thereafter until the relationship is terminated. 
11. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that their personal 
information will only be collected and processed for legitimate purposes and 
retained only for as long as required by these purposes.  The purposes for 
collection and processing should be explained to the home user before 
collection or processing takes place. 
12. Banks should make the home users of online banking aware that they will be 
notified if it can be established that their personal information has been 
compromised. 
13. Banks should make home users aware that they are entitled to confirm what 
personal information is held for the purpose of online banking as well as 
update or delete, or request to be updated or deleted, personal information held 
by the bank for the purpose of online banking. 
14. Banks should make home users of online banking aware that they will be 
informed should a requestor other than the home user attempt to access their 
personal information or financial information.  The bank should also inform 
the home user of their rights to refuse access to their personal information by 
the requestor. 
15. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they 
review their bank statements and reconcile their accounts on a regular basis.  
16. Banks should make personal clients using online banking aware that security 
of their personal computer is the responsibility of the personal client. 
17. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they 
read and understand the terms and conditions associated with the online 
banking service before signing up for the service. 
18. Banks should recommend to personal clients using online banking that they be 
careful to enter accurate transaction information as transactions cannot be 
reversed without the recipient’s consent. 
 
In summary, banks need to demonstrate to home users a stern stance on information 
security, make home users of online banking aware of the risks they face when 
making use of the online banking service and advise home users on what personal 
information they need to keep confidential. 
 
V. COMPARISON OF BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
There is a close link between information security best practice and legislative 
requirements for information security, making them hard to separate (British 
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Standards Institution, 2005; King Committee on Governance, 2009).  For example, in 
control section A.15, international best practice ISO/IEC27001 deals with compliance 
with legislative requirements, including laws, regulations, statutes and contractual 
obligations.  Also, compliance with legislative requirements can be achieved by 
implementing best practice controls, such as implementing COBIT to comply with 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Compliance ensures that, should a legislative breach occur, the 
organisation is able to demonstrate due care and due diligence, avoiding financial and 
legislative consequences (von Solms & von Solms, 2004; Williams, 2008).   
 
In section 3 and section 4, ISA best practice recommendations and ISA legal 
requirements were identified.  In this section, a comparison between these 
recommendations and requirements is made to determine if implementation of the 
identified ISA best practice recommendations will result in compliance with the 
identified ISA legal requirements.  Figure 1 illustrates the gap between the selected 
legal requirements and selected best practice recommendations by showing which 
best practice requirements support each legal requirement. 
 
Finding 1: The results show that the implementation of the selected best practice 
recommendations would fully satisfy seven of the 18 legal 
requirements only and partially satisfy the other nine. There are no 
other recommendations offered for two of the 18 legal requirements.  
Finding 2: Compliance with legal requirements 1 to 4, 6, 8 and 17 may be 
achieved through the implementation of best practice 
recommendations. 
Finding 3: Legal requirement number 5 is partially satisfied by the selected best 
practices.  Selected best practices require a bank to demonstrate a stern 
stance on risk management, but do not explicitly require a bank to 
disclose incidents which would be material to the home users’ 
decisions to continue making use of the online banking service. 
Finding 4: Legal requirements number 7 is partially satisfied by the 
implementation of best practice recommendations.  The selected best 
practice recommendations do not explicitly require banks to make 
security software available to home users of online banking, as 
required by legal requirement number 7.  However, the selected best 
practices recommend that banks make home users of online banking 
aware of countermeasures they can implement and recommend 
awareness materials reach all home users.  Security software may be 
included in the awareness materials;   
Finding 5: Legal requirement number 9 is only partially satisfied by the 
implementation of selected best practice recommendations.  The 
recommendations do not state the need to update the content of the ISA 
programme to include new threats.  However, the Standard of Good 
Practice for Information Security statement UE6.2.6 recommends that 
banks should review security incidents and use findings to update the 
next ISA programme aimed at home users of online banking.  Such a 
review would reveal previously unidentified threats to home users of 
online banking. 
Finding 6: Although the selected best practices recommend that banks make home 
users aware of how they can protect their personal information, legal 
requirements 10 to 15 suggest that best practices do not offer sufficient 
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guidance on ensuring privacy of personal information.  However, the 
Standard of Good Practice for Information Security section UE6.1 does 
address information privacy, recommending that banks develop and 
implement approved methods for handling personally identifiable 
information.  
Finding 7: No matches for legal requirements numbers 16 and 18 suggest that the 
selected best practices do not stipulate the need for home users to be 
made aware of what their responsibilities are when protecting 
themselves. 
 
It may, thus, be concluded that implementing the ISA recommendations identified in 
the selected best practices does not result in compliance with the ISA requirements 
identified in the selected legislation. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A large number of South African home users are becoming aware of and are able to 
use online banking, facing multiple information security threats while they do so.  
From a security perspective, the human element of the security chain must be 
addressed.  Therefore, the focus of this research has been on home users and the 
actions South African banks are required and recommended to take when 
implementing Information Security Awareness (ISA) programmes aimed at home 
users of online banking. 
  
South African banks need to protect their home users from the information security 
threats they face as online bankers, be able to demonstrate due care and due diligence 
when addressing these information security threats by implementing best practice, and 
they must recognise and comply with the legal requirements imposed on them.   
 
This research set out to determine if implementation of selected best practice 
recommendations for information security awareness will result in compliance with 
ISA legal requirements placed on South African banks when raising information 
security awareness amongst the home users of online banking.  Findings demonstrate 
that implementation of the identified best practice recommendations does not result in 
compliance with the identified legal requirements. 
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Figure 1 Comparison of legal requirements and best practice recommendations  
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